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Chapter!I:!Why!Realism!and!Revolution?!
 Revolutions have been formative to the International System throughout its 
existence. It is therefore surprising that, in the words of Fred Halliday, there has been 
such a “mutual neglect” between International Relations and Revolutions Studies.1 Even 
realist par excellence Stephen Walt admits, “Despite its practical importance and 
theoretical potential, the topic of the relationship between revolution and international 
politics is surprisingly under-studied.”2 In a scathing critique on realism, K. J. Holsti 
argues, “Perhaps the most damaging lacuna in realism is its dismissal or lack of interest 
in revolutions.” He continues, “To leave out one of the most important “international” 
events – revolutions – from analysis is a major shortcoming of realism’s theoretical lens 
and its capacity to generate convincing general characterizations of the world of 
international politics.”3 Realism must rise to meet this challenge.  
Realism, including its structural variety, fails to explain the cause of revolutions. 
As a result, the tradition is confined to discussing revolutions post festum, that is, post-
revolutionary state behavior. This neglects the most consequential aspect of revolutions – 
their occurrence. It also overlooks how they emerge. Furthermore, the absence of a theory 
of revolution gives rise to a distorted view of the post-revolutionary state in the 
International System, which captures how the International System socializes the post-
revolutionary state but is unable to theorize about how the post-revolutionary state, in 
turn, affect the International System through shifting the distribution of capabilities. 
Given the role of revolution in suppressing and augmenting state capabilities, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Fred Halliday, "'the Sixth Great Power': On the Study of Revolution and International Relations," 
2  Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996a) 6.  
3 K. J. Holsti, “Performance and Perils of Realism in the Study of International Politics,” in Brecher, 
Michael, and Frank P. Harvey, eds. Millennial reflections on international studies, (University of 
Michigan Press, 2009), 98. 
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determines power relations on the International System, the inability of realism to capture 
revolutionary phenomena is problematic for its claims to offer a descriptive and 
prescriptive theory of International Relations. Realism requires an etiology of revolution 
to rectify its current inadequacies.  
 
 
Revolutions in the International Realm 
Many have dismissed revolutions as beyond the purview of International 
Relations, viewing them as distinctly a domestic phenomenon. The domestic analytical 
bias permeates the International Relations discipline where revolutionary phenomena is 
often black-boxed within the state-unit. Paul Rich suggests, the “fact that most of [the 
work on revolutions] occurred outside the arena of IR meant that it tended to develop in a 
comparative rather than international perspective.”4 Perhaps surprisingly, the reverse 
holds true for comparativist studying revolutions who amalgamate international affairs, 
qua definitione exogenous to domestic borders, as undefined “fortuitous circumstances,” 
to use Barrington Moore’s phrase.5 Yet, revolutions do not exist within a box, not in 
cause or in effect. The err in reasoning is twofold: (a) to bifurcate the cause and 
consequence of revolutions into a domestic and an international box; (b) to dismiss the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, Renegade States : The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign 
Policy (Manchester; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in 
the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1995) 19.  
5 As Moore explains using the Chinese Revolution, “fortuitous in the sense that they did not derive 
from anything taking in place in China itself.” This claim is not applicable to most 3rd Generation 
Revolutions Scholars who assumes a structural approach, which will be discussed at length later in 
this paper.  Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy : Lord and Peasant in 
the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967)214.  
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international box altogether. As John Dunn succinctly states, “There are no domestic 
revolutions.”6 Its international dimension must be retained. 
Revolutions are inextricably international phenomenon in numerous respects. 
First, the origin of revolution can be traced to strain put on the state from its position in 
the International System. Theda Skocpol notes, “Modern social revolutions have 
happened only in countries situated in disadvantages positions within international 
arenas.”7 In addition, war, the threat of war, or the financial burden of war often provides 
the immediate crisis that triggers the collapse of the state and marks the start of 
revolution. This, in turn, greatly influences how the revolution is carried out and even the 
nature of the post-revolutionary state. 
Second, revolutions have a profound immediate impact on the International 
System. Stephen Walt points to quantitative data suggesting that ‘revolutionary’ regimes 
engage in war nearly twice the rate of so-called ‘evolutionary’ states.8 Similarly, Robert 
Snyder asserts that revolutions disrupt existing alliances and relations between the 
revolutionary state and other state-actors, which undermines systemic stability.9 The fact 
that the very mechanisms of international relations – such as deterrence, alliances, 
signaling, and diplomacy– break down with a revolutionary state, at least in the short-
term, should raise dubiety about the conspicuous neglect of revolutions in the literature.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  John Dunn 1940-, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979)90.  
7  Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions : A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China (Cambridge Eng. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979)23.  
8 This refers to the more immediate post-revolution time frame. Walt, Revolution and War, 1. See 
Tilly’s discussion on the “important relationship between war and revolution.”  Charles Tilly, "Does 
Modernization Breed Revolution?" Comparative Politics 5, no. 3, Special Issue on Revolution and 
Social Change (Apr., 1973) 446.  
9 Robert Snyder, “U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in 
Relations,” in Revolution: International Dimensions, ed. Mark N. Katz (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2001), 75-113. 
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Third, revolutions challenge the International System itself. Arguably the most 
consequential is the real threat revolutionary states pose to the Westphalian conception of 
sovereignty that underpins international order. “It is a peculiar characteristic of 
revolutions,” notes Peter Calvert, that they “call into question the very nature of state 
boundaries and of the international system of which they have for so long been an 
essential part.”10 The transnationalism of revolutionary ideology is emblematic of this 
point – revolutionary states seek to destroy all traditional boundaries. History abounds 
with examples, from the Marxist revolutionary internationalism realized in the diffusion 
of Communism to Ayatollah Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih that led to the Iran-Iraq War. 
Not only do new revolutionary states deviate from normative behavior, they invite status 
quo powers to likewise undermine the system by creating a security incentive to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of a state in the midst of a revolution in order to preempt 
conflict. The resulting cognitive dissidence between immediate national security and 
long-term systemic stability leads to misperceptions and miscalculations, confusing 
decision-making. The perceived opportunity to further state interests by intervening in 
revolutionary states further confounds the situation.11 
Fourth, revolutions have, historically, profoundly altered the structure of the 
International System. Their impact continues long after the revolutionary state has been 
re-socialized into the International System. Unfortunately, those outside the Marxist 
tradition have not adequately dealt with the long-term consequence. As Rich notes, 
“When revolutions have been considered from an international perspective they have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Peter Calvert, Revolution and International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 1. 
11  Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," World Politics 40, no. 2 
(Jan., 1988) 150.  
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often been viewed as of relatively minor long-term significance.”12 This holds especially 
true for Realism. While capturing the more immediate post-revolutionary socialization of 
state-units, they fail to notice long-term underlying power shifts that result from 
revolutions. The resulting variation of post-revolutionary power redefines normative 
structures. This will be treated later so a synoptic explanation will suffice for now. 
Revolutions profoundly increase state power in the long-term by means of centralization 
and rationalization. Numerous authors, including Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, 
Samuel Huntington, and Theda Skocpol have written on this subject.13 The resulting 
increase of state power redefines the balance of power, as the post-revolutionary state 
become a principal regional or global actor, and thus the structure of the International 
System. As Kenneth Waltz writes, “consequential variations” in number of principal 
actors in the International System will “lead to different expectations about the effect of 
structure on units.”14 This is to say, while post-revolutionary states are socialized 
according to the normative structure of the International System, they come to redefine 
the structure given a greater timeframe. The argument becomes more intuitive when 
illustrated anecdotally by examining the importance of post-revolutionary France, China, 
Russia, and Iran in the International System. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Chan and Williams, Renegade States, 18. 
13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, Ed. Jon Elster 
and Arthur Goldhammer, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 183; Max Weber et al., 
The Russian Revolutions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 175-180; Samuel P. 
Huntington and Harvard University., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968) 12; Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," 
World Politics 40, no. 2 (Jan., 1988), 48-49; and Theda Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger, “Revolutions: 
A Structural Analysis,” in Jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical 
Studies (Belmont, Calif. ; London: Wadsworth, 2002), 68. 
14  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 
1979)162.  
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In short, so-conceived ‘domestic’ revolutions are undeniably a foundational and 
problematic international event. Unfortunately, even the occasional theorist who allows 
revolutions out of the cage of the ‘unit-level phenomenon’ fails to capture how 
revolutions have helped define and redefine the International System repeatedly 
throughout modern history.15 As Halliday finds, “Revolutions are part of the foundation, 
the formative process, of modern states, modern politics, and the modern international 
system.”16 Echoing this sentiment, Rich declares, “revolutions can be seen as an intrinsic 
part of the development of war, the nation state and international relations generally.”17 It 
is therefore a curious quality of modern IR theory that revolutions are viewed as beyond 
the modi operandi of the international system.  
Revolutions, it is implicitly argued, are the disruption of normal affairs. Carl 
Friedrich in his The Pathology of Politics goes as far as to claim, “they are spoken of as 
an “illness” or “sickness” of the political order.”18 Huntington expresses this much when 
he labels revolutions with “other forms of disorder.”19 Elsewhere he comments that the 
discipline of Political Science grew out of the belief that “radical change could be viewed 
as a temporary deviation in, or extraordinary malfunctioning of, the political system.”20 
Such arguments rest uneasily on a biased revision of modern history. As Martin Wight 
famously opinions, “It might well be asked why unrevolutionary international politics !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See  Fred Halliday, "'The Sixth Great Power': On the Study of Revolution and International 
Relations," Review of International Studies 16, no. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 207-221.  
16  Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics : The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power 
(Durham, NC: Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1999) 23.  
17 Chan and Williams, Renegade States, 25. 
18  Carl J. (Carl Joachim) Friedrich 1901-, The Pathology of Politics; Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, 
Secrecy, and Propaganda (New York: New York, Harper & Row, 1972) 37.  
19  Samuel P. Huntington and Harvard University., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 358.  
20  Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," 
Comparative Politics 3, no. 3 (Apr., 1971) 284.  
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should be regarded as more normal than revolutionary, since the history of international 
society has been fairly equally divided between the two.” To this end he calculates 
between 1492 and 1960 that “there are 256 years of international revolution to 212 
unrevolutionary.” 21 To equate the established order with an immutable normal is to 
ignore Heraclitus’ admonition: Πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν µένει.22 
 
 
Revolutions in IR Literature 
 To preface, it is sufficient to state that the literature on revolutions in International 
Relations is meager at best. The challenge revolutions pose to International Relations is 
not especially unique, for, according to Alex Callinicos, “Few subjects in social and 
political theory pose greater difficulties today than that of revolution.”23 Nevertheless, it 
is concerning that the disciplines of International Relations and Revolution Studies – as 
Walt contends –  “do not even engage in much of a dialogue.”24 Problematically, as Chan 
and Williams further explain, “There have been few attempts to link the growing but 
dispersed theory about both revolution and international relations (IR) in a coherent 
way.”25 This reflects the substantial theoretic gap between Comparative Politics and 
International Relations, which complicates work between the two branches. Accordingly, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad and Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester : Leicester 
University Press, 1978a)92.  
22 Everything changes, and no thing abides. 
23 Alex Callinicos, “What does Revolution Mean in the Twenty-First Century?” in  John Foran, David 
Stuart Lane and Andreja Zivkovic, Revolution in the Making of the Modern World : Social Identities, 
Globalization, and Modernity (London ; New York: London ; New York : Routledge, 2008).  
24  Stephen M. Walt 1955-, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 
1996b) vii.  
25  Chan and Williams, Renegade States : The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy 
(Manchester; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in the 
USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1995)3.  
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efforts will be made for bridging comparative work on revolution and International 
Relations. To this end, the existing IR literature on revolutions will now be explored. 
The English School of International Relations has directly addressed the topic of 
revolutions. Tracing its origins to what Timothy Dunne termed the “proto 
constructivism” of E. H. Carr, the English School comprises a rich literature on the 
‘society of states.’26 Martin Wight, one of the English School’s original advocates and a 
seminal thinker of the 20th century within the discipline, rejects the notion of revolutions 
being a domestic affair; rather, through the sheer mass of historical evidence provided, he 
defends their “international aspect.”27 Distinctively, he finds revolutions to be the driving 
force of history. This is to say, revolutions define the organization of the society of states, 
which is then institutionalized by laws, customs, and international organizations. This 
will remain the status quo until another revolutionary wave – what he terms ‘international 
revolution’ – amends the foundation of international society again. Hedley Bull, a student 
of Wight, greatly popularized the English School with his Anarchical Society. Yet, if 
Wight represents ‘one step forward’ on the treatment of revolutions then Bull represents 
‘two steps back.’ Despite furthering the English School tradition by leaps and bounds, 
Bull ignores revolutions, failing to list them as one of his four mechanisms of 
international society.28 Fortunately, the insight was not lost for long. 
 Revolution and World Order authored by Hedley Bull’s student, David 
Armstrong, is widely considered one of the most direct commentaries of the international 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Timothy Dunne, “The Social Construction of International Society,” European Journal of 
International Relations 1, no. 3 (1995), 373. 
27  Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad and Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester : Leicester 
University Press, 1978b) 81.  
28  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1977).  
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aspect of revolutions.29 In it, he attempts to resolve the question: “To what extent do 
revolutionary states succeed in altering the international society of which they find 
themselves members, and to what extent does it succeed in ‘socializing’ them?”30 His 
answer, somewhat unremarkably, echoes the findings of others; namely, revolutions 
challenge international norms but, eventually, become socialized by their environment. 
Still, he provides analytical insight into the dialectic between revolutionary ideas and the 
“Westphalian concept of international society.”31 Overall, Armstrong’ work falls short on 
three counts. First, he exclusively analyzes post-revolutionary states, thus failing to 
account for how revolutionary situations arise in the first place despite claims for 
providing a full account, much like the realist tradition. Second, he does not stipulate 
what comprises international society, preferring to leave his central concept nebulous. 
Third, studying revolutions proves to be a means to further an alternative understanding 
of international society, where norms include the domestic compositions of states 
dissimilar to Wight and Bull’s conceptualization. Yet, the problem of analysis with an 
agenda is self-evident, which he aggravates by writing as if preparing for a doctrinal 
dispute. Still, his writing provides the groundwork for a Constructivist approach to 
revolutions that may yet provide insight. 
 Unlike Wight, Bull, and Armstrong, who can be said to belong to a fairly coherent 
school of thought, Fred Halliday can only loosely be considered to come from the Leftist 
tradition. Susie Linfield elegantly described Halliday as “an uncategorizable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Fred Halliday claims, “David Armstrong’s work is the most systematic attempt from within this 
tradition to meet the challenge posed by revolutions.” Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The 
Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power, 297. 
30  J. D. Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society 
(Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1993a) 1.  
31  J. D. (J Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society 
(Oxford : New York: Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1993b)299.  
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independent” who “embodied the dialectic between utopianism and realism.”32 While 
insightful, his writings are often unsystematic. Throughout his numerous publications, 
Halliday’s portrays the boundaries between state and society as permeable, which allows 
him to capture the international aspect of revolution. For him, “Revolutions as having 
causes rooted fundamentally in international processes: comparative weakening vis-à-vis 
rival states, the uneven and combined spread of modern capitalism, the removal of 
support from regional or global hegemons, and the transnational spread of ideas.”33 These 
divergent factors suggest another theme of his work: the tendency towards first-image 
analysis and the determinacy of ideology, which lends itself to historical sociology rather 
than a political theory. Accordingly, he is much more concerned with historical 
particularities, especially radical foreign policy, than with making normative or 
prescriptive claims about revolutions in the International System.  
 Unlike most authors within International Relations, Halliday views revolutions in 
a positive light. Due to the inherent oppression of the International System, revolutionary 
movements necessarily act against the rules of international order, manifested in laws, 
diplomacy, sovereignty, et cetera, according to an ideal of a universal society. As such, 
they present a challenge in numerous respects, from disrupting existing relations and 
defying norms to, in the long-term, offering a systemic alterative to the existing order. 
Regardless, Halliday faults the status quo powers as responsible for post-revolutionary 
conflict. Revolutions, Halliday argues, fulfill the need of humans “to dream.”34  They are, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Susie Linfield, “The Journeys of Fred Halliday,” The Nation,November 19, 2012,  
http://www.thenation.com/article/170917/journeys-fred-halliday#. 
33  GEORGE LAWSON, "Halliday's Revenge: Revolutions and International Relations," International 
Affairs 87, no. 5 (2011)1068.  
34  Halliday, Revolution and World Politics : The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham, 
NC: Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1999)338.  
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in his words, “the radical rejection of the given” that is “central to the human 
condition.”35 This is diametrically opposed to the common scholarly sentiment within 
International Relations, which holds, as Calvin formulates it, that revolutions hold “no 
great mystery.”36 
 Another leftist approach to revolutions in International Relations can be found in 
Wallerstein’s World-Systems Approach. Largely drawing from the Marxist tradition, this 
theory assumes a world-system– that is, a single division of labor throughout a plurality 
of polities and cultures – defined by an exploitative Capitalist hierarchy that goes through 
historic stages. The division of labor is differentiated geographically into the core, semi-
periphery, and periphery nations, and tied together by world market trade. Sovereign 
states are but “one kind of organizational structure among others within this single social 
system.”37 Nevertheless, they are critical in ensuring not only the appropriation of surplus 
value from labor, but also the “appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by 
core areas.”38 The difference of state strengths leads to operations of unequal exchange 
between the core and periphery.39 The inherent systemic contradiction that results from 
the continual system-wide division of labor and consolidation of capital leads to what is 
termed ‘antisystemic movements,’ which are revolutionary. Since the Capitalist market is 
no longer embedded in the state, “the coming to state power of all these movements has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Ibid. 
36  Peter Calvert, Revolution and International Politics (New York: New York : St. Martin's Press, 
1984a)198.  
37  Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein 1930-, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European 
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: New York, Academic Press, 1974b)7.  
38  Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for 
Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 4 (Sep., 1974a)401.  
39 In other words, Wallerstein believes the state acts as an extra-economic support for capitalist classes. 
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resulted in a very widespread sense of unfulfilled revolution.”40 Problematically, the 
world-system that leads to antisystemic movements “has no overarching political 
structure” for labor forces to overthrow.41 
 In the World-Systems Approach, state structure and policies are reduced to an 
instrument of the economically dominant class who leverages them for world-market 
advantage. Viewed system-wide, all political phenomena are reduced to single division of 
labor that, which in turn is reducible to market exchange and technological production.42 
While parsimonious, Wallerstein’s state reductionism undermines his ability to capture 
international relations. Furthermore, his explanation of revolutions disregards the role of 
the state, which empirically does not hold up. Overall, the World-System Approach lacks 
explanatory capacity due to the failure of recognize the possibility of state autonomy of 
interest and action in the domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, Wallerstein 
excels in demonstrating a causal linkage between the transnational and the national.   
 The next two authors –Kyŏng-dong Kim and Richard Rosencrance –attempt to 
offer alternatives to the realist narrative in order to explain how revolutions interact with 
the international system, although they differ in their approach. Kim favors a perceptual 
explanation where revolutions produce avoidable conflict due to misunderstanding and 
misperception produced by newly introduced revolutionary ideologies in the International 
System. This leads him to a general formula: regional or international unity in ideology is 
determinative of peace, or conversely, heterogeneous ideology is determinative of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40  Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein 1930- and Giovanni Arrighi, Antisystemic 
Movements (London ; New York: London ; New York : Verso, 1989)34.  
41  Immanuel Wallerstein, "A World-System Perspective on the Social Sciences," The British Journal 
of Sociology 61 (2010)172.  
42 The reduction of social relations of production to market exchange is a break from the Marxist 
understanding that social relations are determined by relation to the mode of production. 
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conflict. As he explains, shared values allow states to anticipate reactions and engage in 
positive signaling whereas heterogeneous ideologies introduced by revolutions lead to a 
“distortion of perception.”43 The insight is akin to the logic of Jervis applied to a 
historical analytic approach that strongly rejects the realist tradition. Overall, Kim 
convincingly displays the role of confused signaling stemming from heterogeneous value 
systems following revolutions. Nevertheless, he problematically assumes the perceptual 
variable as exclusively causal and, in doing so, disregards the power relations between 
nations. To claim all post-revolutionary conflict is the product of misperception is to 
overlook the (a) the existing systemic turbulence, (b) the revisionist pursuit of post-
revolutionary radical foreign policy, and (c) the determining role of the balance of power 
in system outcomes.  He also fails to explain the origin and timing of emerging ideologies 
and how counter-hegemonic ideologies gain force in a Gramscian sense. 
 Rosecrance approaches the topic differently, highlighting domestic and 
international structural change in addition to ideological variables. The International 
System is determined by four variables for him. First, direction, or the ideological 
complex of elite objective domestically and abroad, can promote stability in the case of 
ideological harmony. Yet, even serious “ideological frictions are not the sufficient cause 
of instability.”44 Direction can be understood permissive environment for either 
international stability or instability. Second, control, or factors that affect the elite’s 
exercise of control such as scope of power, is tied up with domestic security and 
revolutions. Control patterns the initial disturbance on the International System; actors’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43  Kyŏng-dong Kim 1936-, Revolution and International System (New York: New York, New York 
University Press, 1970) 122.  
44  Richard Newton Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics; International Systems in 
Perspective (Boston: Boston, Little, Brown, 1963)297.  
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reaction to the disturbance is shaped through the balance of power. The third determinant 
is resources, which acts as the base of control. The final factor is capacity, which is 
understood as the total ability of the International System to contain disruption. It is 
suggested that international stability depends on the ability to absorb “convulsive internal 
change” such as revolutions.45 Revolutions and understood within this framework as a 
breakdown of the control variable, which inevitably results in new forms of efficacious 
control after the revolution. Rosencrance views such domestic occurrences as 
unavoidable, and thus the onus is on the International System’s capacity to contain new 
revolutionary actors. Not surprisingly, Rosecrance concludes his Action and Reaction in 
World Politics by noting the high correlation between domestic insecurity of elites and 
international instability. 
 Rosecrance’s work provides a strong account linking revolutions and domestic 
change to international dynamics. Nevertheless, this linkage fails to capture how the 
International System affects internal change, instead viewing ‘disruptions’ as transferring 
from the domestic to the international sphere. Likewise, he avoids any discussion on how 
these disruptions affect other societies through his dyadic framing of revolution as 
between the elite of a potentially revolutionary state and a unitary International System. 
By amalgamating the collection of states into the unitary concept in his understanding of 
the International System, Rosecrance also overlooks how different state actors could be 
affected differently. Still, his work provides a useful framework connecting domestic to 
international change.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45  Richard Newton Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics; International Systems in 
Perspective (Boston: Boston, Little, Brown, 1963) 298.  
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Unlike Rosecrance, the Transnationalism theorists such as James Rosenau and 
Peter Calvert emphasize the inter-societal processes of revolution. Structural conflicts 
over the basic organization of society lead to greater conflicts unto revolution that is not 
contained within a society. Rosenau finds three ‘linkages’ between polities: (a) 
penetrative processes “when members of one polity serves as participants in the political 
processes of another”; (b) reactive processes where “recurrent and similar boundary-
crossing reactions rather than by the sharing of authority;” and (c) emulative processes 
“when the input is not only a response to the output but takes essentially the same forms 
the output.”46 The transnational linkage approach demonstrates how revolutions can have 
a system-wide impact without emphasizing the International System.47 Linkage theories 
rely on a strong agential variable and are underpinned by a behaviorist understanding of 
revolution. For example, Calvert discusses in his Revolutions and International Politics 
the psychological origin of leaderships and even the behavioral qualities of gang 
organization. These theories have not realized their own potential due to a weak 
understanding of revolution, which Calvert loosely defines as “the politics of violence,” 
and the inclusion of too many variables.48 Nevertheless, the inter-societal understanding, 
especially Rosenau’s forms of linkage, provides a powerful tool for understanding 
patterns of inter-societal influences. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  James N. Rosenau ed and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Center 
of,International Studies, Linkage Politics; Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems (New York: New York, Free Press, 1969) 46.  
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Revolutions in Realist Literature 
 Despite boasting a rich tradition, Realism is surprisingly silent on the subject of 
revolutions. The majority of its views are informed either by the work of Henry 
Kissinger, in the case of Classic Realism, or Stephan Walt for Structural Realism.  Robert 
Snyder has also written on the matter, although his work is not widely read. For a subject 
as pertinent to the International Relations as revolution, the poverty of realist literature is 
unexpected. Kissinger claims that revolutionary states are ‘dissatisfied’ with the existing 
international order. As Halliday claims, “For Kissinger, revolutionary states pose a 
challenge to the international balance of power: because of the dissatisfaction that 
underlies the revolution itself, they are states that tend not to accept or recognize the 
limits in the conduct of foreign affairs.”49 Such a state is inherently irrational for “nothing 
can reassure it.”50 This is because it rejects the validity of the international framework 
itself. Demonstrated international stability “implies the acceptance of the framework of 
the internal order by al major powers” and thus bestows legitimacy on the order.51 When 
a revolutionary state rejects conventional rules, it produces a revolutionary order.  
Kissinger’s theory of revolution is incredibly problematic. First, as Kenneth Waltz 
finds, Kissinger’s “reasoning is circular.”52 A revolutionary state rejects the order and a 
revolutionary order contains a revolutionary state. Second, the psychological root of 
revolution – dissatisfaction with the existing order – is projected into the international 
realm as dissatisfaction with the existing international order. Halliday notes, Kissinger 
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“denies any causation of revolution by the social and economic structures of society.”53 
Consequently, revolution is understood merely as the refusal to accept limits. Third, 
Kissinger fails to explain how the international system suppresses dissatisfied members 
through power domination. If dissatisfaction defined a revolutionary order, there would 
never have been a stable order. Likewise, domestically Kissinger’s aggregate-
psychological account of revolution overlooks elite domination that ensures revolutions 
are not a constant affair. There always exists dissatisfaction domestically and 
internationally as interests are frustrated by the rules that disadvantage some over others; 
it is when the power that enforces the rules ceases to prevent their violation that 
dissatisfaction has the opportunity to be demonstrated. Overall, Kissinger provides an 
incredibly weak account for revolutions. Nevertheless, it is the only realist account that 
attempts to capture any causal origin. 
Stephan Walt’s Revolution and War convincingly portrays how revolutions 
exacerbate the security competition between revolutionary and status quo states that 
increases the possibility of war. He frames his argument within a Balance-of-Threat 
model that claims states are more sensitive to perceived threats than power. Aggregate 
power, perceptions of intent, and the offense-defense balance define threats. By 
temporarily depressing state capability, revolutions create a window of opportunity for a 
state to improve its power position through aggression. As a result, the window of 
opportunity also incentives other states to preempt any attempt by another state to take 
advantage of the revolutionary state because that would disadvantage them. Furthermore, 
the revolutions cause (a) a state to change its preferences, leading to new conflicts of 
interests; (b) a distortion of perception of the external environment due to revolutionary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 295.  
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ideologies; and (c) increased uncertainty and misinformation. All this acts to generate a 
spiral of suspicion where insecurity and the perception of threat act to enforce each other. 
Here Walt builds on Jervis’ perception-based spiral model.54 Finally, revolutions attempt 
to export their revolution due to ideological commitments while counter-revolutionary 
states believe revolutions can be stopped through force. The consequence of the increase 
of threat and misperception is the great increase probability that revolution will lead to 
international conflict.55 
Walt succeeds in explicating the causal relation between revolution and war. 
However, his work must be recognized as a limited venture; that is, he does not attempt a 
realist theory of revolution. As such, he is forced into the same position as Armstrong 
where the occurrence of a revolution is assumed and thus theorizing captures only 
phenomena temporally after the revolution. One shortcoming of his approach is that he 
fails to incorporate into his theory how changing power realities due to revolution play 
into the revolution-war nexus. 
Whereas Walt holds both revolutionary and status quo states responsible for post-
revolutionary conflicts based on his threat-based spiral model, Robert Snyder counters 
that it is revolutionary states acting with revisionist intentions that precipitate conflict. 
Snyder approaches the topic from a Classic Realist-Constructivist synthesis perspective 
that is akin to Samuel Barkin’s proposed Realist Constructivism.56 Focusing on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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foreign policy of third world powers vis-à-vis hegemons with the United States as his 
case study, he finds that “revolutionary states externalize their domestic conflict with the 
U.S. following the radicals’ efforts to defeat the moderates.”57 This is the source of 
international disturbance. Revolutionary conflict is externalized according to a four-step 
process: first, a domestic conflict arises; then, this conflict is externalized; in response, 
the hegemon hesitates; finally, the hegemon becomes hostile. His research “challenges 
Walt’s spiral model” and “casts doubts on his theoretical understanding of revolutionary 
states, particularly Third World ones.”58 In particular, the transnational linkage of 
revolutionary states defies Walt’s notion of states as unitary actors; instead, Snyder 
advocates the status quo-revisionist dyad of Classic Realism. 
 
 
Why Realism and Revolutions 
 The question remains: why realism and revolutions? The answer is twofold. First, 
it is because the failure to comprehend the persistent and consequential reality of 
revolutions continues to haunt us today. The impact of International Relations literature 
goes beyond the ivory tower to affect – either positively or negatively – how practitioners 
can manage world politics. Furthermore, as Robert Keohane notes, “world politics today 
is a matter of life and death – not just for soldiers or citizens caught in the path of war, 
but for the whole human race.”59 As such, realist scholars have an obligation to account 
for international phenomena, even if it is not analytically appealing to do so. Recently, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57  Robert S. Snyder, "The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown 
in Relations," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (Jun., 1999) 273.  
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59 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Neorealism and its 
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Joe Hoover condemned what he termed the “failure of realism” vis-à-vis the revolution in 
Egypt.60 While the Arab Spring movements fall short of the criteria for social revolution 
– a term that will be defined in the following chapter – they still reveal how analytically 
unprepared realism leaves us with revolutions.  
Second, it is because revolutions challenge the fundamental assumptions of 
realism. Halliday claims, “Revolutions force us to question the central, realist, 
assumption that internal/domestic structures can be excluded from the study of 
international relations.”61 Furthermore, the case of revolutions shows realism to be in 
tension with itself. Realism claims to give a descriptive and prescriptive interpretation of 
state behavior in international politics, yet fails to provide an account of the sudden and 
dramatic behavior-deviation of revolutionary states. Likewise, it cannot explain why a 
rational state-unit would undergo revolutionary destruction given the window of 
opportunity it creates for surrounding states.  Finally, realism differentiates state-units 
according to its ordering principle of material-capability; yet, it cannot account for the 
increase of post-revolutionary state power by this alone. If realism can resolve these 
tensions in accounting for revolutions, it will further substantiate its explanatory claim to 
international politics. However, a failure to do so may suggest that realism is merely 
interpreting a political symptom of something structurally more profound, as is often 
argued by its neo-Marxist critics. 
 I am convinced that such an attempt to resolve the tension between realism and 
revolutions is not a fool’s errand. It is not necessarily beyond realism to account for 
revolutions. To do so requires providing a realist explanation of the origin of revolutions. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60  Joe Hoover, "Egypt and the Failure of Realism," Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies (JCGS) 
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Given this necessitates an examination within the state-unit, many contemporary realists 
would label such an attempt as ‘reductionist.’ This is particularly true within Waltzian 
Neorealism. Yet, as Barry Buzan conveys, “there has been continuous pressure to push 
what Waltz counts as unit level factors back into the structural level.”62 Revolutions, as 
will be shown, are as structurally dependent upon the capability of the state and the 
international context as wars. Accordingly, a structural explanation of revolutions that 
aligns with the structural realist paradigm is possible. In fact, bridging neorealist and 
third generation ‘structural’ revolutions literature can enrich how each understands its 
own subject matter.    
Revolutions are a structural phenomenon.63 They are not, as is popularly 
conceived, the product of a new ideology or a charismatic leader. Too often the study of 
revolutions connotes a colorful historical account of a teleological movement driven by 
liberté, égalité, fraternité, a proletariat paradise, or the Elysian velayat-e faqih. As such, 
as Maryam Panah has complained, “the origins of revolutionary crises are factored out as 
their causes are deemed to be cultural or ideological ones and the legitimate domain of 
departments of Cultural Studies and Sociology, but not of International Relations—they 
become relevant to IR only when they exhibit ‘rogue behaviour’ that upsets the 
precarious international order.”64 This is an unjustified assumption. Rather, it is origins of 
revolutions that are most relevant to International Relations. Furthermore, these origins 
are structurally determined; in the words of Wendell Phillips, “Revolution are not made; 
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they come.”65 It is only after the structurally determined crisis of the state has occurred – 
theoretically and practically the most significant stage – that a revolution ‘emerges’ in the 
sense of being phenomenologically available to the human experience. 
 There is, in addition to a structural causality, a common subject between 
revolutions and international politics: the state, or more specifically, state power. In 
Neorealism, the state-unit and its capabilities, which determine its power in relation to 
other states, is the most ontologically basic feature of the systems approach. Likewise, to 
cite Vladimir Lenin, “The basic question of every revolution is that of state power.”66 As 
such, a collapse of power in one realm is equally as consequential in the other realm. 
Revolution’s relationship to state power can be understood through the, albeit imperfect, 
comparison to war. As E. H. Carr stated, “War lurks in the background of international 
politics just as revolutions lurk in the background of domestic politics.”67 While Carr 
misrepresents revolutions as a domestic phenomenon, he captures the common relation to 
state power. Both are the self-correcting principle of an existing system, especially during 
periods of systemic transformation. Revolutions can only occur when a state loses its 
capacity to ‘self-preserve’ against endogenous pressure, otherwise domestic threats 
would be suppressed, as is usually the case. Thus, revolutions – like change in the 
International System – require an explanation of how states gain or lose its power 
capacity. Instead of challenging Realism, revolutions can be understood as strengthening 
it by increasing the socio-political cohesion of the state-unit and reinforcing the territorial 
and functional ordering principle of sovereignty in post-revolutionary states. A successful 
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realist account of change (i.e. consequential variation in state power over time) should 
provide the theoretic explanatory power to explicate the origins and consequence of 
revolutions. Exactly how revolution can be explained within the static structural realist 
model is the conundrum to be explored in the thesis.  
 
 
Roadmap 
 Thus far, the reader has been familiarized with both the inadequate 
interdisciplinary ties between Revolution Studies and International Relations and the 
absolute necessity for an international account of revolutions. Next, in Chapter II, 
revolutions will be discussed. Starting with the semantic ambiguity, a definition of 
revolution will be developed, followed by a critical review of the existing literature. 
Chapter III will turn to the realist tradition, where Neorealism will be analyzed for its 
theoretical strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the problem of change and the 
incomplete account of capabilities will be emphasized. In Chapter IV, the groundwork 
laid out in the previous chapters will bear a theoretic fruit – a Structural Realist theory of 
revolution. Here the relationship between deep structural change and state-society 
adaption in structural rationalization will be explicated. Revolutions, it will be found, 
occur when a structural contradiction between state and society, formed due to changing 
material and International conditions, inhibit the mobilization of capabilities, which is 
self-corrected in revolution. Revolutionary occurrences will be highly correlated to 
systemic change, as they are theorized to reflect changing structural realities and, in turn, 
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produce long-term increase of state capabilities that alter the system-wide balance of 
power.  
In the following Chapter V, the implications of the Structural Realist theory of 
revolution will be sorted through. Tensions arising out of the interdisciplinary roots of the 
theory will be resolved on the topics of the agent-structure dichotomy; ideology and 
revolutionary waves; change, ahistoricism and the state; and revolution and war. Chapter 
VI will conclude the thesis by discussing the future of revolution. It will be suggested that 
revolutions – regardless of specific form – will continue to play a formative, albeit rare, 
role in the International System.  
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Chapter!II:!On!Revolution!
 ‘Revolution’ seems like an intuitive concept – this is hardly the case. The word 
can denote and connote a plethora of different and, at times, orthogonal occurrences. It 
has been used to reference a specific phenomenon or categorize a range of activities. 
Accordingly, Calvert finds, “Despite the intense interest that the subject has attracted in 
both scholarly and popular literature over the past twenty years, it remains as elusive as 
ever.”1 Perhaps, that is a semantic complication. Indeed, the polysemy is evident with 
even a cursory examination. The word revolution rings far beyond the granite walls of the 
world’s social science departments, as popular culture abounds with ‘revolutionary’ hair 
products, protein shakes, Christian mingle sites, and the like. The problem is, as Halliday 
explains, “the concept ‘revolution’ has evolved over time, and contains variant 
meanings.”2 For example, Montesquieu’s employment of the term is antithetical to the 
usage in this paper: “a revolution that would not change the form of the government or its 
constitution.”3 Likewise, Martin Luther King, Jr. even speaks specifically of a “social 
revolution” in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail in reference to the contentious politics 
of the civil rights movement.4 Social science has not escaped this, where revolution can 
denote coups, urban insurrection, guerrilla warfare, et cetera.5  In short, as Crane Brinton 
slyly understates, “revolution is one of those looser words.”6 
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Whither (to Define) Revolution? 
It follows that, before revolutions can be explained, they must first be defined, 
although the two are an inherently interrelated process. Chan and Williams have argued, 
“The expression ‘revolution’ has been overused to the point of becoming almost 
meaningless.”7 While there is validity in this claim, it should not suggest that the concept 
of revolution be altogether abandoned. Rather, a definition of revolutions must be 
reclaimed – at least within the social sciences. The difficulty is that revolution, beyond its 
polysemy, is a profoundly historic concept. As a result, as Antonio Negri’s work reveals, 
“Over the last two hundred years it has meant everything and its opposite, the good and 
the bad, emancipation and terror, etc.” Tilly further notes, “whether it includes coups, 
assassinations, terrorism, or slow, massive changes such as industrialization is 
controversial not only because the world is complex but also because to call something 
revolution is, within most forms of western political discourse, to identify it as good or 
bad.”8 In order to clarify the concept of revolution, it will be helpful to have a basic 
understanding of the origin and development throughout history. This will provide a solid 
foundation to build an analytical definition of revolutions for this thesis. Against the 
criticism that such an exercise amounts to hollow academia, I must defer to the stance of 
historian R. H. Tawney, who once commented, to look to the past is “to summon the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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living, not to invoke a corpse, and to see from a new angle the problems of our own age, 
by widening the experience brought to their consideration.”9 Without further ado, let the 
summoning begin! 
 
 
Historic Understanding of Revolution 
 The concept of revolution has a long history.10 Calvert has traced it all the way to 
ancient Egypt where “[r]evolution represented a reversion to the primitive practice of 
sacrificing a weak ruler when he had outlived his usefulness.”11 The concept truly began 
to take form during Roman and Greek Antiquity. Arendt relates, “Antiquity was well 
acquainted with political change and the violence that went with change, but neither of 
them appeared to it to bring about something altogether new.”12 In the Greek setting, 
revolution implied the dissolution of stasis that captured both the change of rulers due to 
palace revolt and “the social displacement implied by the rise of an aristocracy or the fall 
of aristocratic exclusiveness.”13 Thucydides gave a famous account of revolution in 
Corcyra in his The Peloponnesian War where he states, “Revolutions… occurred and will 
always occur so long as human nature remains the same.”14 Aristotle captures the cyclical 
nature of political change that underpinned Antiquity’s conception of revolution. He 
writes in Book V of his Politics, “Revolutions break out when opposite parties, e.g. the 
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rich and the poor, are equally balanced, and there is little or nothing between them; for, if 
either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them.”15 
The prime cause of revolution is inequality, which manifests itself differently in different 
government types. Ted Gurr summarizes, “the principal cause of revolution [for 
Aristotle] is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common 
people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they 
have.”16 Revolutions can be pursued “by force and by fraud” and can alter the 
constitution or the form of government.17 
 The concept of revolution lost significance during the Dark Ages where violence 
against the throne was considered sacrilegious. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
outright rejects the possibility of violence against a tyrant in his Summa Theologica18. 
The concept only regained popularity during Reformation, where it began to connote a 
return to the Christian community before the papacy. Göran Therborn has tied the 
concept of rolling back to “originally the stone in front of the grave of Jesus.”19 It was not 
only in theology that the concept of revolution was being used to denote a rolling back. 
The word revolution came into Old French as early as the late 14th century from the 5th 
century Post-Classic Latin revolutio (return or recurrence of point or period in history) 
and was used to describe celestial bodies, such as with Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of 
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Celestial Bodies.20 Richard Pipes traces the shift to a more modern understanding through 
astrology: 
From astronomy, the word passed into the vocabulary of astrologers, who 
claimed the ability to predict the future [through] the study of the heavens. 
Sixteenth-century astrologers serving princes and generals spoke of 
"revolution" to designate abrupt and unforeseen events determined by the 
conjunction of planets-that is, by forces beyond human control. Thus the 
original scientific meaning of the word, conveying regularity and 
repetitiveness, came, when referring to human affairs, to signify the very 
opposite, namely, the sudden and unpredictable.21 
 
Revolution quickly began to develop its modern definition soon after. It gained the 
meaning of political change in 1615, a coup d’état in 1636, a change in government by 
violent means in 1680, and in 1688 the Glorious Revolution solidified its political 
meaning.22  
 The French revolution and the fall of the ancien régime in 1789 marked the birth 
of the modern nation-state and the modern understanding of revolution as a mass uprising 
against the state leading to a fundamental reordering of society. Pipes notes that 
“henceforth began to refer to grandiose plans to transform the world – no longer to 
changes that happened but to changes that were made.”23 George Pattee similarly found 
that “after the French Revolution we find a conscious development of revolutionary 
doctrines in anticipation of revolutions to come, and the spread of a more active attitude 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 This can be traced to the earlier Latin form revolvere or “turn, roll back.” “revolution (n.)” Online 
Etymology Dictionary, accessed April 1, 2013, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=revolution&allowed_in_frame=0 
21 Richard Pipes, “A Concise History of the Russian Revolution,” accessed April 2, 2013, 
http://chagala.com/russia/pipes.htm 
22 "revolution, n.". OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/164970?rskey=lB8H8c&result=1 (accessed March 14, 2013). 
23 Pipes, “A Concise History of the Russian Revolution.” 
!! 33!
towards conscious control over institutions in general.”24 This is captured in the word of 
Thomas Paine: 
What were formerly called Revolutions, were little more than a change of 
persons, or an alteration of local circumstances. They rose and fell like 
things of course, and had nothing in their existence or their fate that could 
influence beyond the spot that produced them. But what we now see in the 
world, from the Revolutions of America and France, are a renovation of 
the natural order of things, a system of principles as universal as truth and 
the existence of man, and combining moral with political happiness and 
national prosperity.25 
 
The intentionality implicit in the concept of revolution left a huge impact on the epoch to 
follow. 
 Nineteenth-century Europe experienced a radical wave in its intellectual tradition 
with the emergence of professional revolutionaries. These revolutionaries actively aimed 
at, in the words of Leon Trotsky, “overturning the world.”26 As Karl Marx argued in his 
Theses on Feuerbach, “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it.” Despite the claims of action, revolution was also 
understood as inevitable to a certain degree, as a historical necessity. During the Cold 
War the concept of revolution was thoroughly ideologically polarized. For many third 
world independent movements of the time, it became a liberation ideology that was fused 
with nationalism. The concept of revolution today carries the ideological baggage of the 
19th and 20th century. Still, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the recent Arab Spring, 
revolution is reemerging as a democratizing concept.  Now that the concept of revolution 
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throughout history has been clarified, a definition of revolution will be developed for the 
realist theory of revolution that will later be developed.  
 
 
Revolutions: A Definition 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennet find, “Better results are achieved if the 
“class” of the phenomenon to be investigated is not defined too broadly… [it should be] a 
well-defined, smaller-scope subclass of the general phenomenon.”27 Based on this 
criterion, Stephen Walt provides a decent definition of revolution: “the destruction of an 
existing state by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political 
order.”28 Still, this definition fails to recognize an essential difference between what is 
termed a political and a social revolution. Due to the resilience of the state, especially of 
the bureaucracy as Weber notes, it is not possible to produce profound institutional 
changes without fundamentally reorganizing the societal structure upon which the state 
apparatus is constructed.29 As such, ‘political revolutions’, defined as transformation of 
“state structures but not social structures,” can only create superficial structural change.30  
History is full of political revolutions – the Arab Spring revolutions being the most recent 
case. While more common, these revolutions have less of a long-term impact on society 
and the International System. With the former, it is because social structure remains 
intact, including structures of elite dominance; with the latter, the socialization process 
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returns state behavior to normative patterns while the any variance in state capability is 
minimal, and thus does not greatly affect the balance of power.  
Scholars often fall into the theoretic trap of failing to distinguish between a 
political revolution and what is called a ‘social revolution.’ Goldstone, in his self-
proclaimed ‘fourth generational’ definition, commits this error by defining revolution as, 
“an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political 
authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and 
noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities.”31 He problematically 
makes a claim on the whole class of revolution while only discussing political change in 
state structure. A definitional distinction between political and social revolutions must be 
upheld for, as Skocpol argues, “analytic oversimplification cannot lead us towards valid, 
complete explanations of revolutions.”32 
The subject examined in this thesis is social revolutions. These differ from purely 
political revolutions by reordering the social structure as well as the political structure. 
Social revolutions will be defined as the rapid, basic transformation of the political and 
socio-economic structure of an individual state that is accompanied and in part carried 
through by mass-based revolt from below. This definition of social revolution has been 
adapted from Theda Skocpol’s definition.33 It has been altered according to Wickham-
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Crowley’s suggestion of replacing class-based with mass-based and a rewording of the 
state provided by Calvert in order to deemphasize the focus on class.34 The result of such 
a stringent definition of revolution is that few cases of social revolution exist. According 
to John Foran, “the list of twentieth- century social revolutions: Russia 1917, China 1949, 
Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979, Iran 1979 in the first instance; and, arguably, Mexico 1910-
20, Vietnam 1945-75, Algeria 1954-62, and Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the 
1970s, among others, if the definition is relaxed somewhat.”35 This is not a definitional 
weakness; it is a historic reality – social revolutions are a historically rare yet profoundly 
formative phenomenon. For convenience sake, revolution should be understood as social 
revolution unless otherwise specified. 
 
 
Explanations of Revolutions 
 It must be prefaced that revolutions, like all complex phenomena, can be 
understood from innumerable perspectives. To study revolution through a purely causal 
prism does not preclude the possibility or merit of examining the influence of the French 
Revolution on male footwear, the economic impact of changed shipping lanes during the 
Iranian revolution, or trends in post-revolutionary race relations. Neo-Kantian 
philosopher Heinrich Rickert once suggested that all phenomena could be described in 
infinite unique ways since the subject of study is limited only by human creativity and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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35  John Foran, "The Future of Revolutions at the Fin-De-Siecle," Third World Quarterly 18, no. 5 
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imagination.36 If nothing else, this claim holds with the complex, dynamic experience of 
revolutions – the ways to approach revolutions are endless. As such, it must be clarified 
that the subject of study here is a causal account of revolutions. This allows all non-
causal variables and considerations to be abstracted away, resulting in a more 
parsimonious account of revolution. 
Yet, confusing the matter is the fact that revolution scholars have argued for 
numerous sets of deterministic causal factors, ranging from agency, gender, and race to 
class and culture. 37 Goldstone alone includes “economic downturns, cultures of rebellion, 
dependent development, population pressures, colonial or personalistic regime structures, 
cross-class coalitions, loss of nationalist credentials, military defection, the spread of 
revolutionary ideology and exemplars, and effective leadership” as possible causes.38 The 
preferred explanation of revolution has developed in three waves: the first generational 
natural histories, the second generational political violence, and the third generational 
structural theories.39 Out of this literature an explanation of revolution – the foundation 
for the upcoming international theory of revolution – will be developed. 
 It is generally agreed upon that the 1930s saw the beginning of Revolution 
Studies, although Goldstone dates it as far back as 1900.40 This early wave of Natural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Oakes, Guy, Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1988), 54. 
37 For a critical overview of schools of revolution theory, see Farrokh Moshiri, “Revolutionary 
Conflict theory in an evolutionary Perspective,” in Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh 
Moshiri, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 4-36; Skocpol, 
States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3-9. For examples of 
the most prominent theoretical approaches, see John Foran, Theorizing Revolutions (London: 
Routledge, 1997). 
38  Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, Vol. 4, 2001) 172. 
39 It should be noted that the recently proposed ‘fourth generation’ of literature is non-existent, the 
work done merely amounts to an intergenerational synthesis that offers little to no new perspective. 
40  Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," World Politics Vol. 32 No. 3 , 
April 1980, 425. 
!! 38!
History authors tended towards simplistic, historical accounts of revolution with minimal 
theoretic work involved. This first generation included American authors such as Lyford 
P. Edwards who wrote that revolutions are caused by “repression of elemental wishes” 
and thus revolutionary violence will reflect degree of repression, and George Pettee who 
discusses society feeling “cramped” by unjustified repression.41 Crane Brinton, who 
developed a general, historical sociological model of revolutions based almost 
exclusively on the French Revolution, stands an exception to the over-simplification of 
the time. Anticipating the social equilibrium arguments that became prominent in the 
second-generation literature, Brinton argues, “As new desires arise, or as old desires 
grow stronger in various groups, or as environmental conditions change, and as intuitions 
fail to change, a relative disequilibrium may arise, and what we call a revolution break 
out.”42 Likewise, he engages in proto-aggregate psychological explanations critical in the 
work of Davies, Gurr, and others. Finding subjective ‘feelings’ more revealing than 
objective ‘conditions’, he declares, “Of much greater importance is the existence among a 
group, or groups, of a feeling that prevailing conditions limit or hinder their economic 
activity.”43 While anticipating much of the second generation, Brinton is not especially 
systematic in his writing and often relied on vague psychological assumptions, drawing 
heavily from Le Bon’s questionable work on crowd psychology.44  Nevertheless, Brinton !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should be recognized for introducing a social science approach to revolution that broke 
from the polemical work of Marx and Engels that predated him. In particular, his 
conception of the state as semi-autonomous is instrumental in understanding 
revolutionary dynamics.  
The second-generation of theorists who came onto the scene in the late 60s and 
early 70s focused on collective political violence. They shared a common two-stage 
framework: stage one was normal/equilibrium/ harmony, and stage two was revolution, 
with a variable standing between the two. Despite this essential similarity, Goldstone 
notes how the second-generational theories “drew heavily on broad theories from 
psychology (cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory), sociology 
(structural-functionalist theory), and political science (the pluralist theory of interest-
group competition.).”45 Psychological theories focused on collective cognitive states, 
especially vis-à-vis expectations. Many of the models, such as the James Scott’s Moral 
Economy model or James Davies’ J-Curve model, trace mobilization to the popular 
perception of adverse trends limiting class potential – immediately experienced or 
anticipated, respectively.46 Davies’ model in particular highlights the destabilizing effect 
of short-term economic lapses of growth, which leads to frustrated expectations; yet, like 
Scott, he ultimately fails to explain (a) the dynamics of change on a macro-structural 
level and (b) why revolutions occur in some societies and not in others, despite similar 
dynamics.  
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Ted Gurr presents the most sophisticated model of frustration-aggression theory.47 
He begins with the “seemingly self-evident premise that discontent is the root cause of 
violent conflict.”48 This discontent is due to a relative deprivation, which is “a perceived 
discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities.”49 It is critical 
to note that is it not objective discrepancy but the perception of deprivation. Interlacing 
his aggregate-psychological approach with societal conditions, Gurr finds societal 
conditions such as the systematic closure of political and economic opportunity to certain 
groups is often causal in creating the discrepancy between expectations and value 
satisfaction. When this occurs, it disposes men to violence thus producing collective 
action. According to his basic frustration-aggression proposition, the degree of frustration 
directly correlates to the degree of aggression against the source.50 Revolution results 
from an extreme case of relative deprivation. 
The sociological strand of the second generation pulls heavily from Talcott 
Parson’s systems-approach to society and seeks to explain causes of systemic 
disequilibrium. Chalmers Johnson is exemplary of the Parsonian functionalism prominent 
of American post-war sociology.51 He posits two clusters of mutually influencing 
necessary causes of revolution. The first is pressures created by a disequilibrated social 
system, which exists when values and environments are desynchronized due to external 
or internal intrusions such as technologies. This causes societies to become disoriented 
and thus willing to accept alternative value systems. Critically, the source of social 
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disequilibrium is dissimilar to the source of revolution, although it creates the necessary 
environment. The second causal cluster is the quality of the purposeful change being 
undertaken. This “depends upon the ability of the legitimate leaders.”52 Any factor that 
either deprives the elite’s ability to enforce social behavior or causes the illusion of the 
loss of elite’ coercive capabilities acts as the sufficient cause. These are enforced by 
immediate causes of revolution are labeled ‘accelerators’.53 Revolution is a special 
category of social change that introduces violence into civil social relations. Violence is 
considered a rational strategy with the expressed intention of altering social 
constructions. Problematically, the sociologist’s focus results in the complete exclusion 
of any international or global considerations.  
The Political Science branch of the second generation of literature is based on a 
pluralist methodology where revolution is the ultimate conflict between interest groups. 
Of the many authors, Samuel Huntington is by far the most influential, viewing 
revolution as intrinsically tied to modernization. Modernization is a multifaceted process 
that introduces change to all aspects of human thought and activity. Significantly, it 
removes “major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments,” 
freeing the population to be socialized according to new behavioral patterns.54 
Additionally, it develops economics leading to a profound increase in economic activity 
and output of a society. The result of social and economic modernization is political 
instability where “the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization.” 
(Huntington and Harvard University. 1968b) According to Huntington’s Gap Hypothesis, 
the gap between social and economic modernization determines the impact of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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modernization on political stability. Revolution, “a rapid, fundamental, and violent 
domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political 
institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies,” is an 
extreme case of when political institutionalization occurs at a rate too slow for the pace of 
social change.55 Political institutions prove incapable of channeling new social forces 
whose preferences are excluded from politics. Accordingly, revolutions are unlikely in 
political systems that have the capacity to incorporate the participation of new social 
forces, which explains why there has never been a revolution in a democracy.  
 Huntington is often criticized for tailoring his model to Western revolutions. John 
Gillis contends Huntington’s analysis is tied “to the European regimes of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”56 Furthermore, his view that “Modernization 
is a homogenizing process” leads him to assume a single or converging path from 
traditional society to modernity, which disregards the transnational structures that 
diversifies modernizing paths.57 This leads Tilly to charge Huntington with being weak 
on “large-scale structural change.”58 By including anything from ideological and 
technological change to forming economic groups and elite structure, Huntington fails to 
provide an elegant theory. Consequently, modernization becomes a “vague, tendentious 
concept” that is also value-laden with the Western view of modernization.59 Still 
Huntington’s work deserves to be recognized for revealing how change relates to 
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revolution. In particular, his insight of how new social forces are obstructed by lagging 
political institutions, causing strain that result in revolution must be taken seriously. 
Charles Tilly represents a transitional figure between generations of literature. 
While emphasizing the collective violence of the second-generation, he provides a 
structural account akin to the third generation. For this reason, John Foran places Tilly 
among the third generation, a move Goldstone and Skocpol strongly reject.60 Tilly’s 
Contention Model of Revolution is based on the capacity of challengers to state power to 
mobilize resources and build a coalition strong enough to challenge and ultimately 
overthrow the state. Here revolution is understood as a special type of collective action 
with the replacement of the political sovereignty as the goal. Long-term shifts in balance 
of resource in society due to “the rise and fall of centralized states, the expansion and 
contradiction of national markets, the concentration and dispersion of control over 
property” and medium-term occurrences that increase popular discontent and introduce 
radical ideologies lead to the formation of coalitions of contenders. When these coalitions 
become sovereign polities, revolution becomes possible. Following the work of Trotsky, 
Tilly bifurcates revolution into the revolutionary situation and the revolutionary outcome. 
A revolutionary situation arises when “one bloc [is] effectively exercising control over a 
significant part of the state apparatus.”61 A bloc includes a coalition of classes, a 
modification Peter Amann suggested to Trotsky’s dominant-class approach.62 
Revolutions “ends when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government.”63 
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Tilly’s account is alluring on several levels. Unlike many theorists before him, he 
holds aggregate discontent as irrelevant to collective action unless it is organized into a 
coalition that is able to mobilize resources. Even if this occurs, action may not occur if 
the government or elite is able to mobilize its resources to repress it. While he does not 
reject aggregate-psychological factors, problematically depending on social-
psychological hypotheses to explain the emergence of revolutionary contenders, he 
frames them within the structural constraints of the balance of resources.  Likewise, the 
balance of resources is key in predicting whether a government is able to prevent the 
emergence of multiple polities. Additionally, within his framework, he does not give 
primacy to certain structures over others. As he notes, the “[r]apid rural-to-urban 
migration has no particular tendency to excite protests; marginal urban populations are 
not the tinder of revolutions; the initial exposure of peasants to factories does not 
generate high levels of industrial conflict; and so on.”64 The advantage of this becomes 
apparent when examining the tendency of the third generation of literature to give 
explanatory primacy to agricultural structure. 
Recently, with the emergence of the third generation in the 70s, there has been a 
paradigm-shift in the field towards a state-centric structural approach that comes out of 
the strong Neo-Marxist tradition. It has provided an explanative power that other 
theoretical approaches lack; most significantly, it addresses the elusive puzzle of why 
t=n, i.e. when revolutions occur, while still providing predictive power to revolutionary 
outcome. Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf proved instrumental in initiating the shift by 
assuming a macro-sociological level of analysis in the 1960s. Moore’s seminal The 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy unveils the obscured human cost of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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change, revealing that both evolutionary and revolutionary paths are stained in blood.65 
He finds four preconditions to revolutionary action: first, elite loss of control over means 
of violence; second, the emergence of a conflict of interest within the dominant classes; 
third, the emergence of an alternative mode of thought that undermines predominant 
justification for human suffering; and fourth, the mobilization of revolutionary masses 
due to a disruption of daily affairs compounded by an increase of misery. In a similar 
macro-historic approach, Wolf’s comparative study on twentieth century peasant wars 
assumed a structural framework, where foreign pressures include wars and 
commercialization of agriculture – the result of population growth and capitalism – lead 
to a social dislocation from traditional order.66 While failing to fully commit to a purely 
structural approach, especially by retaining a cultural aspect, the authors moved beyond 
the structural-functionalist tendencies of the second-generation sociological approach. 
Even within the structural literature, a variety of explanations began to emerge. 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley is exemplary of common units of structural analysis:  
“(1) world-systemic structures of international trade, finance, and 
investment; (2) patterns of interstate competition, conflict, domination, 
alliance, and cooperation; (3) state-class relations within individual 
nations, especially over issues such as taxation, governance, coercion, and 
access to state power; (4) patterns of class, ethnic, religious, and perhaps 
gender conflicts (or alliances); and (5) the relations of formal 
organizations, including social movement organizations, to the society, as 
mediated by social networks.”67 
 
His overview left out two more popular approaches. First, several later structuralist 
authors, such as S. N. Eisenstadt, have argued for a culturally oriented structural analysis. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Culture, in the structural sense, is normally explained as a summation of patterned 
tendencies.68 Second, Jeffery Paige and others have focused on structures of peasant 
unrest.69 In this case, “the state, urban actors, and nonexport-oriented rural sectors” are 
completely bracketed out.”70 By narrowing down the topic of analysis, Paige is able to 
reach incredibly specific conclusions: “Decentralized share-cropping systems therefore 
create the conditions for a social movement based on revolutionary socialism as the 
dominant ideology and warfare as the dominant tactic.”71 These historical conclusions 
tend to be non-generalizable. 
Theda Skocpol employs a similar methodology that emphasizes peasant 
structures; still, her incredibly influential work stands out for its ability to generate 
convincing conclusions about revolutionary activity. Until Skocpol, no theorist had truly 
comprehended the intrinsically international role of modernization.72 In particular, her 
work reveals how international military and economic competitions can directly affect 
domestic state stability, providing a causal linkage between the international and 
domestic spheres through the state. In her comparative examination of the French, 
Chinese, and Russian Revolution, she concluded that “(a) the centralized, semi-
bureaucratic administrative and military organizations of the old regimes disintegrated 
due to combinations of international pressures and disputes between monarchs and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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landed commercial upper classes, and (b) widespread peasant revolts took place against 
landlords” was common in all cases.73 
Skocpol develops a strong state-centric structural methodology noteworthy for its 
high explanatory capacity. Her approach is structural in two aspects: first, it examines 
inter-unit relations, such as class-class, class-state, and state-state; and second, 
revolutions result from a singular objectively conditioned crisis that is not attributable to 
any single unit. Furthermore, the state proves crucial in her argument. She convincingly 
argues, “The key to successful structural analysis lies in a focus on state organizations 
and their relations both to international environments and to domestic classes and 
economic conditions.”74 Here, states are conceived as “administrative and coercive 
organizations – organizations that are potentially autonomous from (though of course 
conditioned by) socioeconomic interest and structures.”75 Fahri Farideh finds Skocpol’s 
notion of state autonomy her most “controversial contribution” to the literature.76 The 
state proves critical to her often-overlooked duality of (social) revolution, where social 
and political structures are both profoundly changed so as to mutually reinforce each 
other.77 This is a change from the sociological second-generation of literature that 
focused on social systems at the expense of political institutions. Furthermore, Skocpol 
correctly recognizes the state as a macro-structure instead of a political arena, refuting the 
prominent pluralists’ school of thought.78 Likewise, she views it semi-autonomous from 
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direct dominant class control, which avoids the socioeconomic reductionism of the 
Marxist approach. 
Skocpol situates the state between two transnational contexts. First is the structure 
of the world capitalist economy and the international system. Inter-unit competition 
within these systems strained the state, explain why revolutions occurred in countries 
both “caught behind more economically developed competitor nations” and where 
“existing structures made it impossible for [the states] to meet the particular international 
military exigencies.”79 Second there is what she terms ‘world time’, which “affect both 
the overall world context within which revolutions occur and the particular models and 
options for action that can be borrowed from abroad by revolutionary leadership.”80 To 
clarify, Skocpol believes world time operates through (a) developing a repertoire of 
action through historical demonstration that can be emulated later and (b) the juncture of 
two historical occurrences that interact. While including world time allows Skocpol to 
capture the transference of historically particular significance in the form of events, 
ideologies, and aspects of culture, it sacrifices the ability to make generalizable claims. 
For her macro-historical purpose, it is a worthy tradeoff. The emphasis is thus on the 
content of change instead of the dynamics of it.  
Overall, the third generational literature contains the best analytic tools for 
uncovering the causes and processes of social revolutions. It avoids the necessity of 
reducing explanations to complicated psychological (i.e. moral economy/ relative 
deprivation) and personality (e.g. elite intransigence) determinants or relying on overly 
simplistic historic accounts. Furthermore, it provides theoretic elegance while explaining !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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why revolutions occur when they do (why t=n). A focus on structure avoids the common 
mistake of understanding revolutions as the product of a voluntaristic endeavor. 
Nevertheless, the third generation literature is limited in generating general comments 
about revolution due to its macro-historical methodology. Structure is derived a 
posteriori from historical cases, summating structural commonalities between them, and 
thus cannot make normative claims or extrapolate to other cases. This type of structure 
reflects a sample of cases is called ‘descriptive structure’.  
With a descriptive structure, a general explanation of revolution is not possible. 
Trimberger prefaced her famous Revolution from Above by noting its “emphasis on both 
structural and historical determinants of revolution from above indicates that there can be 
no general theory of revolution.”81 The problem with creating an inductive general theory 
is that future trends do not necessarily reflect past ones. For example, the agrarian-
peasantry focus of Skocpol, Wolf, Paige, and Eisenstadt have lost relevance with the 
recent urbanization trends.82 As such, ex ante analysis becomes unachievable, which 
should concern the practitioner and practically-inclined. Furthermore, each sample of 
cases yields different results. Whereas Skocpol examined the three ‘Great Revolutions’, 
Paige exclusively studied late 19th and early 20th century Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa – inevitably ‘historic’ variables between the samples radically vary. The result, as 
Goldstone found, is that “studies of the impact of agrarian structure on peasant 
revolutionary participation have yielded contradictory results.”83 In short, such an 
inductive approach to theory building has its advantages; nevertheless, it is ill suited for a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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general theory due to its historical contingency found in ‘world time’ or ‘historical 
determinant’ variable. 
 A general structural explanation of revolution is needed. Such an approach would 
necessarily have to shift from a descriptive structure to a generative structural theory of 
revolution. Reliance on generative structures, where deeper structures have causal 
priority over superficial ones, would allow an abstraction away from superficial 
comparative historical descriptions, thus permitting for a general theory. Constructing a 
generative structural theory would necessitate limited a priori ontological assumptions 
given its hypothetico-deductive nature. Nevertheless, the descriptive and prescriptive 
theoretic capacity would outweigh this cost. The insight of the third generation, 
especially Skocpol’s state-centric strand, could be retained. Farideh Farhi demonstrates 
how Skocpol’s approach can be applied beyond the Classic Revolutions of France, China, 
and Russia.84 Such a theory would need to develop a framework to explain the dynamic 
of change instead of comparing the content of change found in historical cases. This 
parsimonious general structural theory of revolution will be developed within the 
tradition of structural realism. 
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Chapter!III:!On!Realism!
 Realism has a long history. Its realpolitik origins can be traced as far back as 431 
B.C. to Thucydides, who penned The History of the Peloponnesian War. Later political 
theorists, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and later Thomas Hobbes, augmented the tradition. 
Yet, the Realist school did not formally emerge until the 1940 publication of The Twenty 
Year Crisis by E. H. Carr. Carr wrote against what he deemed the “inadequacy of pure 
aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics” that marked the legalistic 
inter-war Idealism school of thought.1 Eight years later, Hans Morgenthau’s seminal 
Politics Among Nations was released. Like Carr, Morgenthau sought to make 
international relations into an objective science unlike the “scientific utopianism” of 
Idealism.2 Classic Realism emphasized the relations between nation-states, the character 
of government, and the relation to society, implicitly identifying “the state as an agent of 
the larger nation.”3 In the wake of failed appeasement and rising fascism in the 1930s, 
Realism soon replaced Idealism as the dominant theory of International Relations.4 It has 
remained so, in several forms, ever since.  
 Classic Realism soon fell under attack for its vague and problematic reliance on 
human nature (i.e. animus dominandi), statesmen, and the attributes of states to explain 
international relations.5  Kenneth Waltz emerged as a leading critic, first in his Man, the 
State, and War where he rejected what he termed first and second image analysis and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1940), 13. 
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 7th Edition, 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2005), 41. 
3  Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (Dec., 1989) 460.  
4 Robert J. Lieber, No Common Power: Understanding International Relations 4th Edition, (Upper 
Saddle River: Pearson Education: 2001), 9. 
5 Additionally, its attempts to explain foreign policy was highly contested.  
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later in his Theory of International Politics where the two are amalgamated into the 
‘reductionist’ category. These works provided a new foundation for an elegant systems 
version of Realism to emerge – Neorealism.6 
 
 
Neorealism: A Theory 
 Neorealism is not a theory of everything. In fact, it is not even a theory of 
everything international. Rather, it is a power theory of international politics.7 This is not 
to reject the existence and importance of international economic or diplomatic relations; 
Waltz freely admits as much. Furthermore, it does not claim to explain all international 
political phenomena. Quite the opposite, it adamantly rejects any attempt to explain 
foreign policy. What Waltz’s structural theory of international politics does do is “fix 
ranges of outcomes [among states] and identify general tendencies, which may be 
persistent and strong ones but will not be reflected in all particular outcomes.”8 Thus, 
while Waltz’s structural approach can “never tell us all that we want to know,” it does 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 As Barry Buzan notes, “Since the publication of Kenneth Watlz’s Theory of International Politics… 
Neorealism has become a dominant school of thought in International Relations theory.”  Charles A. 
Jones 1949-, Little Richard and Barry Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural 
Realism (New York: New York : Columbia University Press, 1993) 1.  
7 “An international-political theory serves primarily to explain international-political outcomes… But 
saying that a theory about international economics tells us something about politics, and that a theory 
about international politic tells us something about economics, does not mean that one such theory can 
substitute for the other. In telling us something about living beings, chemistry does not displace 
biology.”  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 
Pub. Co, 1979) 38.  
8 Waltz describes his theory as a structural theory in this passage, as opposed to a systems theory as he 
does elsewhere. Wendt has argued that Waltz’s theory cannot be classified as a structural theory, but 
can as a systems theory. Kenneth Waltz, “A Response to my Critics,” in Robert O. Keohane, 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 344. ; Alexander E. Wendt, 
“The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 
3 (Summer, 1987), 335-370  
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“tell us a small number of big and important things.”9 Waltz’s systems theory of 
International Relations is notable for providing its ability to explain international 
dynamics – description – and make strong normative claims – prescription – all within an 
ultra-parsimonious framework.  
Neorealism conceives the International System as defined by anarchy in which 
like-units – states – strive to ensure their own security. 10 This is dissimilar to the 
centralized hierarchy of the domestic system, which is black-boxed. Anarchy is not only 
descriptive; it is explanatory of behavioral outcomes by providing a permissive 
environment where no central authority can enforce behavior. In the resulting self-help 
system, only the state can ensure its own survival. The unitary states are distinguished 
solely by their capabilities – “population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”11 Power, a single 
variable, is a function of the differentiation of capabilities between state-units, which 
provides the structure of a system – the balance of power. 12 Since power can only be 
considered comparatively, being a relational concept, it is thus a systemic variable.13 A 
state’s behavior is determined in by its position in the balance of power, which informs 
state-level expectations and defines the dynamics in an international system. For the state, 
power provides the means of self-preservation. For the system, the number of hegemons, 
which is described in terms of polarity, give shape to the system. 
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9 Waltz, “A Response to my Critics,” 329. 
10 A system is “composed of a structure and of interacting units”  Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979) 18.  
11  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 
1979) 131.  
12 Ibid., 98. 
13 As such, conversations of absolute power are misled. One can only have absolute capabilities, since 
power presupposes one or more other units  
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Neorealism: A Theory Explained 
In Neorealism, states are not power maximizing, which may compromise security; 
instead, they seek to increase security. 14 This represents a break from the Classic Realist 
tradition, where “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power,” and 
offensive structural realism, where states do seek to maximize power.15 Consequently, 
Waltz falls into the defensive realist camp. Scholars often confuse the significant 
difference between power maximizing and security seeking behavior, where security-
seeking states may avoid opportunities to increase power for fear of triggering a spiral 
model conflict.16 Waltz goes as far as to claim that states may not even necessarily “bend 
all its efforts towards securing its own survival.”17 Rather, a high margin of security is 
sought, since, as David Baldwin points out, “absolute security is unattainable.” 18 The 
very fact of international conflict perforce indicates that interests exist beyond security – 
for logically, if all states sought only security, there would be no threat that causes the 
security dilemma. Interests, it should be noted, can be “endlessly varied.”19  While 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 88, 91. 
15  Barry Hoffman donor and Hans Joachim Morgenthau 1904-, Politics among Nations; the Struggle 
for Power and Peace (New York: New York, Knopf, 1967) 5. Indeed the power vs. security 
maximizing is at the heart of the schism between defensive realism and offensive realism. For 
Offensive Realism, see  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: New 
York : Norton, 2001).   For an overview of the debate, see Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring 
Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” in Political Science: State of the Discipline III ed. Ita Katznelson 
and Helen Milner, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 204–210; Michael E. (Michael Edward) Brown 
1954-, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy : Contemporary Realism and 
International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995).  
16 Keohane makes this mistake when he chastises Waltz for power maximization hypotheses. See 
Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in  Keohane, 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 174.  For Waltz’s stance and 
response, see  Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 
1979) 127.; Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 334.  
17 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), 206. 
18 David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, vol. 23, 1997, 15. 
19 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91. Waltz further argues, “If all states wanted simply to 
survive, then none would need to maintain military forces for use.”  Kenneth Neal Waltz 1924-, Man, 
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security is taken to be the objective interest of every state, it is unclear if the secondary 
and tertiary interests are objective as well.  
Another common point of confusion is the role of anarchy, which can be 
attributed to Waltz’s own inconsistency of thought. In Man, the State, and War, Waltz 
convincingly argues anarchy provides the permissive cause (nothing prevents State A 
from acting on State B), which is combined with the efficient cause (State A and State B 
have a conflict of interest) to produce the self-help attribute of the system.20 Yet, as 
Wendt notes, the efficient cause relies on first-image and second-image 
explanations.21Consequently, he reverses his stance in Theory of International Politics to 
disregard efficient causality. Yet, anarchy as a permissive environment alone cannot 
provide a causal account of the system’s attributes. On further point, Waltz’s anarchic 
international system has often been compared to a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra 
omnes due to the permissive environment. Nonetheless, Waltz argues that, while always a 
possibility, is not always realized. He believes that “order may prevail without an 
orderer.” This would be a function of a stable balance of power, which depends on the 
system’s polarity. Yet, without an orderer, order could never be ensured, hence ‘the 
tragedy of great power politics.’22 
Waltz is often charged with reducing state behavior to structure, thus 
compromising any notion of agency. Structure, playing such a critical role in Waltz’s 
systems theory, deserves a closer examination.  On one hand, Waltz is very explicit in 
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the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis (New York: New York, Columbia University Press, 1959) 
204.  
20 Waltz, Man, The State, and War, 234 
21 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), 395. 
22 This line is a reference to Mearsheimer’s work 
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rejecting claims that structure determines behavior; he argues that it “can tell us what 
pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, 
but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to 
those pressures and possibilities.”23 It would seem that agential variant behavior is 
permitted, albeit only through unit irrationality. On the other hand, by amalgamating 
power and structure into one concept, Waltz’ parsimonious sytems theory necessarily 
abandons state agency to the exogenous formation of behavior. While he does admit that 
states must find ways to conform to the structural reality, he then argues that the most 
rational way of doing this will be emulated by all, thus reducing any implicit diversity of 
action into a unity of behavior.24 The ontological primacy of Waltz’ structural power and 
its description as unintentional have led many to charge Neorealism with either equating 
power with structural restraint or making it an “amorphous all-encompassing concept.”25 
Waltz’ positional understanding of power structure rejects popular choice-theoretical 
modes of explanations. This tension in the agent-structure dichotomy has been addressed 
for clarification yet will not be resolved, for it is beyond the purpose of this thesis and the 
capability of this author to do so.26 
Two further qualities of Waltzian structure must be highlighted: its generative and 
positional nature. The structure is generated due to state interaction; yet, the structure is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71. 
24 States, like firms in microeconomics, must act rationally or else fail. Waltz defines rationality 
loosely as “do better than others.” Whatever this entails, it must be emulated by all states. This 
implicitly argues that irrational states cannot exist over time, for if they are not socialized, they will be 
destroyed through competition – the twin mechanisms of structure. Ibid., 77. This amounts to an 
individualist-utilitarian conception of rationality where behavior is understood instrumentally as a 
means to an ends. 
25 Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: the Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” International 
Organization 47, no. 3 (1993), 469. 
26 Waltz himself is often inconsistent on the issue, usually permitting agency when discussing the state 
but rejecting it when he turns to structural or systemic topics. 
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not defined by the interaction, as the interaction is abstracted away in a systems theory. 
Instead structure is a product of their relative capabilities.27 State interaction is only the 
necessary precondition to structure. This captures the structural logic of Waltz: “Each 
[state] is not just influencing the other; both are being influenced by the situation their 
interaction creates.”28 States are conditioned by the resulting unintentional power 
structure, nolens volens. By defining the International System by the arrangements of its 
parts, possible due to the generative structure Waltz employs, “one arrives at a purely 
positional picture” where unit-location in the system defines its behavior.29 Now that the 
deeper theoretical considerations of Neorealism have been discussed, it is time to turn to 
a concept that is foundational to Neorealism and at the center of our investigation into 
revolution – power.  
 
 
Neorealist Power 
Within International Relations, Brian Schmidt claims, “the concept of power is 
closely associated with the theory of realism.”30 This understatement is undeniable. One 
needs only to reflect briefly on why Realism is often referred to as power politics. This 
‘close association’ is even more evident with Neorealism, which bases its whole systems 
theory on a concept of power. Nevertheless, no less than Kenneth Waltz found that 
“although power is a key concept… its proper definition remains a matter of 
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27 Waltz argued that one “must show how the systems level, or structure, is distinct from the level of 
interacting units.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 40. 
28 Ibid., 74 
29 Ibid., 80. 
30 Brian Schmidt, “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power,” Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies 33, no. 3 (2005), 523. 
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controversy.”31 Stephen Walt adds, “There is still little agreement on how it should be 
conceived and measured.”32 Gilpin, exhibiting less restrain, declares the multiplicity and 
variety of definitions of power as “an embarrassment to political scientists.”33 Power 
must be understood.34 
In Structural Realism, state-units are distinguishable only by their relative power 
within a system. “Power,” according to Gilpin, “refers simply to the military, economic, 
and technological capabilities of states.”35 More specifically, power is capabilities 
understood systemically, which is generative of the system’s structure. This is critical – 
states and their capabilities are ontologically prior to structures. This leads Alexander 
Wendt to charge Neorealism with ontological unit reductionism, which reduces “the 
structure of the state system to the properties and interactions of its constituent elements, 
states.”36 The result of reducing structure to states is that states become the individual 
explanatory factor while structure cannot be understood independently, which is reflected !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Kenneth Waltz, “Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A response to My Critics,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 333. 
32 Schmidt, “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power,” 547. 
33 Robert Gilpin, “The Nature of Political Economy,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts 
and Contemporary Issues (10th Edition), ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, (New York: Pearson 
Education, 2010), 267. 
34 The concept of power is key to the analysis of this thesis; nevertheless, it is a nebulous concept. 
Margaret and Harold Sprout claim, “Power is one of the most common terms in the vocabulary of 
international politics.”  Sprout, Margaret, 1903-2004,joint author and Harold Sprout 1901-1980, 
Foundations of International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand, 1962) 136.  
Regardless, as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane add, it “has always been an elusive concept for 
statement and analyst of international politics; now it is even more slippery.”  Joseph S. joint author 
Nye and Robert O. (Robert Owen) Keohane 1941-, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in 
Transition (Boston: Boston : Little, Brown, 1977) 11-19. Structural Realism conceives of power in 
terms of capability, which is not measured based on demonstrated outcome. While this understanding 
is analytically strong, the concept of power is still elusive. Perhaps the best description of power is 
offered by Nye: “Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few 
understand it… Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real 
for that.” Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: New 
York : Public Affairs, 2004) 1.  
35  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge ; New 
York : Cambridge University Press, 1981) 13.  
36 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 339. 
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in the Neorealist methodological individualism. The primacy of power in the Neorealist 
account is evident. 
Despite the multiplicity of capabilities, power is conceived unitarily. Furthermore, 
Waltz’ whole notion of a monolithic power structure is dependent on a fungible power. 
Schmidt found this to be a product of Waltz’ parsimony, which “necessitates that he 
define power in terms of resources and, furthermore, that he assume that these resources 
are highly fungible.” Yet, this overlooks how the underlying microeconomic model in 
Waltz’s theory necessitates a monetary fungibility for power. Some – such as David 
Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey – finds the parallel to be acceptable, claiming, 
“power is to political science what wealth is to economics, but not nearly as 
measurable.”37 Others have been far more critical, arguing that “the tendency to 
exaggerate the fungibility of power resources and the related tendency to neglect 
considerations of scope” weakens Neorealist claims.38 Kissinger declares, “power is no 
longer homogenous,” prompting Waltz to counter, “The economic, military, and other 
capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighted.” Rather, state rank 
“depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and 
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, 
and competence.” 39 Power is, in a word, homogenous.  
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37 David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War,” in  Bruce M. Russett, Peace, War, and NumbersSage Publications, Inc, 1972) 19.   
38  David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies," 
World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979) 42.  See  Nye and Keohane, Power and Interdependence : World 
Politics in Transition (Boston: Boston : Little, Brown, 1977) 42-49.; Jones, Richard and Buzan, The 
Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: New York : Columbia University 
Press, 1993) 54-56.  
39  Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979) 103.  
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While the conversation over the homogeny and fungibility of power is often 
discussed, the source of capabilities is not. The lack of literature within Structural 
Realism on the subject is undoubtedly tied to the problem of reductionism, which Waltz 
defines as understanding a system but the attributes and interactions of its parts.40 Robert 
Cox finds, “Neorealism implicitly takes the production process and power relations 
inherently in it as given elements of the national interest, and therefore as part of its 
parameter.”41 Classic Realism fairs better is this respect. Another under-theorized aspect 
of structural realism is that of change. 
 
 
Change in Neorealism and Beyond 
Neorealism struggles to capture change due to its “atemporal structuralism.”42 
This is especially true when “the sources of the change lie in the world political economy 
or in the domestic structure of states.”43 In Neorealism, Walker notes, diachrony is 
studied synchronistically; process is a matter of ongoing relations constrained by 
structure.”44 This is because Waltz’ theory “contains only a reproductive logic, but no 
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40  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 
1979) 79.  
41 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” in  Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 216.  
42  R. B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Mar., 1987a) 78. ; see Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in 
Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 265-267. ; Jones, 
Richard and Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1993) 10.; Rob BJ Walker, "History and Structure in the Theory of 
International Relations," Millennium-Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989), 163-183.; 
Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 211-214.  
43 Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Robert O. 
Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 159.  
44  R. B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Mar., 1987b) 77.  
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transformational logic.”45 The emphasis on continuity of the International System instead 
of the change of its content reflects Waltz’ priority. Transformation can only occur within 
the Neorealist model when anarchy is substituted with hierarchy, which has historically 
never occurred and, if the Structural Realist tradition is correct, never will happen.46 
Gilpin defends the emphasis on continuity, arguing, Thucydides “provides insights today 
as it did when it was written in the fifth century B.C.”47 By focusing on continuity of 
framework, Structural Realism is able to attain elegance. Conversely, to comment on the 
content of the International System would limit Structural Realism’s ability generate ex 
ante statements, as is the case with Constructivism. Yet, change is a continuous feature of 
the International System. Including change into the theoretical framework of the 
International System does not necessitate a commentary on its content. In a later revision, 
Waltz claims “Systems change, or are transformed, depending on the resources and aims 
of their units and on the fates that befall them.”48 Still, this general statement hardly 
suffices in explaining how change arises within the systems-theory of international 
politics. Several questions remain unanswered: how do resources change? How does aim 
affect system transformation if structure determines outcome? What causally accounts for 
‘fate’?  
  There have been two dominant modes of explaining change within the 
International System coming from Realism and Marxism. Both explain change in terms 
of differentiating increase of power among states. Yet, while Realism stresses uneven 
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45  Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 26.  
46  Jones, Richard and Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: 
New York : Columbia University Press, 1993) 87.  
47  Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge ; New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 1981) 211.  
48  Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 343.  
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power growth that is theoretically underdetermined based in a strong account of 
international relations, Marxism provide a strong causal account of uneven development 
based on profit motives in Capitalist Society that is situated in an impoverished 
understanding of the International System. Within the Marxist tradition, change occurs 
across history when a contradiction forms between the forces of production and the 
relations of production, leading to a revolution that transforms the mode of production. 
For this reason, Marx claims, “Revolutions are the locomotives of history.”49 Within a 
historical stage, the superstructure, which acts to reinforce the forces and relations of 
production, is conditioned by changes in its economic base. Robert Cox argues, 
“Historical materialism examines the connection between power in production, power in 
the state, and power in international relations. Neorealism has, by contrast, virtually 
ignores the production process.”50 Still, the Marxist account of change struggles to 
translate into the international realm due to the lack of a Marxist theory of International 
Relations. Martin Wight contends, “Neither Marx, Lenin, nor Stalin made any systematic 
contribution to international theory; Lenin’s Imperialism comes nearest to such a thing 
and this has little to say about international politics”51 Likewise, Kubálková and 
Cruickshank note “the truly incredibly divergences between Marxism and International 
Relations.”52  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49  Karl Marx 1818-1883, The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850 (New York: New York, 
International Publishers, 1964) 120.  
50 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 216. 
51 Martin Wight, “Why is There no International Theory?” in  Martin joint ed Wight and Butterfield, 
Herbert, Sir,1900- ed, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966) 25.  
52  A. A. Cruickshank and V. Kubálková, Marxism and International Relations (New York: New 
York : Clarendon Press, 1985) 2.  
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Marx and Engels theorized that the bourgeoisie struggle not only against other 
classes within a nation, but with the bourgeoisies of foreign nations. Marx writes in The 
Civil War in France, “The international relations of capitalist countries are always a 
result of foreign policies in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices 
and squandering in piratical wars the people’s blood and treasure.”53 Lenin augmented 
the Marxist stance on International Relations in his Imperialism, The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism. Here Lenin forwards his Law of Uneven Development – the tendency for 
rates of profit to fall causes advanced capitalist states to compensate through imperialist 
expansion.54 This is built on the theory of diminished returns popular among many the 
classical school of economy. Imperialistic wars, it is concluded, are endemic to 
Capitalism because capitalist economies grow and accumulate capital at different rates. 
Classic Realists primarily view of the fundamental cause of war among states and 
change in the International System as tied to the uneven growth of power between 
nations, although alliance factors are considered.55 Power directs resources away from 
other social objectives, and thus is the product of a domestic effort. Organski finds war 
due to “the differences in rates of growth among the great powers.”56 More specifically, 
the manner and rate of national growth changes the pool of resources available for a 
nation, which produces the conditions for international conflict. When national growth 
causes a select number of new states to assume positions of power over their rivals in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  Ibid., 34.  
54  Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, a Popular Outline (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1975) 175.  
55 Structural realist diverge on the cause of war, many including perceptual variables. See  Kenneth N. 
Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 , 
615-628.; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). For more on uneven growth, see  Jean M. Gilpin and Robert Gilpin, 
The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).   
56  Abramo FK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, University of Chicago Press, 1981) 61.  
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International System, war ensues. Robert Gilpin synthesizes Classic and Structural 
Realism with his seminal War and Change in World Politics to further the study of 
change within the realist paradigm. 
Gilpin begins with a description of the International System reminiscent of the 
English School: “actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to 
advance particular sets of political, economic, or other types of interests.”57 Over time, 
the interest of these actors and the balance of power they reside in shift due to changes in 
economic, technological, or other developments. This produced a ‘disjuncture’ between 
power distribution and the International System, which is the precondition for political 
change. Consequently, the actors who would benefit from a change in the system attain 
the means to enact such change, leading to a new system that reflects the new balance of 
power and interest of the dominant members. From the state point of view, it is a cost-
benefit analysis based on the material environment and the international balance of 
power. 
 Change in the International System, thus, reflects change in power realities. A 
system returns to equilibrium when the distribution of benefits and costs mirrors the 
distribution of power, which implies “no state believes it profitable to attempt to change 
the system.”58According to Gilpin’s model of change, the International System can be 
described as cyclical where the disjuncture between the system and the distribution of 
power grows until “hegemonic war and the peace settlement create a new status quo and 
equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power in the system and the other components 
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58  Ibid., 14.  
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of the system.”59 The dynamic of change is due to the changing material environment and 
the tendency “for [the] economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the 
economic capacity to support the status quo.”60 Finally, change can be divided in three 
catagories: (a) interaction change, or change in the normative interactions or processes 
among entities in the International System; (b) systemic change, or change in the form of 
control or governance of the system; and (c) systems change, or change in the nature of 
the actors or diverse entities that compose the system. This last category – systems 
change – is largely ignored by International Relation literature.61 
Overall, Gilpin provides a strong account for change in the international realm. 
His theoretical shortcomings derive from his sociological understanding of the 
International System. First, he prefaces his argument by trying to argue that Waltz’ 
systems theory provides a sociological framework, within which an economic 
individualistic rational-choice approach is employed. Gilpin then uses this understanding 
to create a pseudo-Parsonian functionalism theory of international society that deals with 
equilibrium within a social system. Even his inclusion of rational-choice assumptions is 
problematic due basing his cost-benefit analysis on ‘satisfaction.’ For example, he writes, 
“An international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the 
system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, and economic arrangement.62 
Including ‘satisfaction’ as a variable is difficult to operationalize and suggest general 
poor theorizing.  
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59  Ibid., 15.  
60 Ibid., 11. 
61 Gilpin declares, “Although students of international relations have given little attention to this 
category of change and have left it (perhaps wisely) to the philosophers of history, it should be more 
central to their concern.” Ibid., 41. 
62 Ibid., 11. 
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On an analytic level, Gilpin fails to address how systemic disequilibrium is at 
times absorbed into the international system through adjustment and at other times 
produces a disjuncture that leads to crisis. As Keohane notes, Gilpin merely “restates the 
problem without resolving it.”63 Furthermore, the degree of intensive (domestic) and 
extensive (international society) considerations render his theory notably inelegant. 
Finally, Gilpin’s formulation of the International System cannot be reconciled with 
Neorealism, although it can with Classic Realism.64 This is primarily because the 
purpose-driven orientation of Gilpin’s theory (i.e. seeking satisfaction) counters the 
structuralism (i.e. determining range of outcomes) of Waltz’s conceptualization. 
Structural realism requires another account for change. 
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63 Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” 178. 
64 See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 
24, no. 2 (Autumn, 1999), 5-55.  
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Chapter IV: Towards a Structural Realist Theory of Revolution 
 Realism requires a theory of revolution. With the existing literature, realists are 
confined to explaining the socializations process of post-revolutionary states and their 
relation to war. Accordingly, the tradition has failed to explain: (a) why a state-unit self-
destructs, which ostensibly violates the rationality of a security-seeking unit, given the 
window of opportunity it creates; (b) the sudden behavior deviation of a state-unit, which 
both undermines specific mechanisms of the International System such as alliances, 
deterrence, and diplomacy and generates misperceptions and miscalculations; and, most 
importantly, (c) the consequential increase of state-unit capabilities, which alters the 
Balance of Power over time and thus restructures the entire International System. Such a 
theory should build on the Structural Realist paradigm, given that the literature that draws 
from Classic Realism leads theorist to under-determined volunteeristic conclusions such 
as Kissinger’s ‘dissatisfaction’ explanation of revolution or Gilpin’s ‘dissatisfaction and 
disequilibrium’ theory of change. Yet, Structural Realism is ill equipped to deal with the 
question of revolution – lacking a theory of the state, a theory of change, and a theory of 
power production.1 For revolutions to be explained within the Structural Realist tradition, 
questions of the state, change, and power production must be engaged. 
 
 
Theory-Building 
 A Structural Realist theory of revolution will now be developed. Adopting the 
position of Buzan, Little, Jones, and Keohane, ‘Neorealism’ will be reserved for “Waltz’s 
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1 To clarify, there is a rich realist literature on measuring capabilities, but not their production. 
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narrow theory of international politics;” instead, the label ‘Structural Realism’ will be 
used in order to connote the greater theoretic tradition.2 Curiously, critics of a general 
theory of revolution in International Relations preexist a theory itself. Chan and Williams 
argue, “The variety and number of revolutionary states make a general theory, at this 
early stage of their appreciation by International Relations, impossible.”3 Citing the 
opposite rational, Skocpol claims, “a primarily deductive and universalizing mode of 
theory-building makes no real sense for explaining revolutions, because there have been, 
by any well-focused definition, only a small number of cases, and all of them, as the 
etiology of the concept “revolution” implies, have occurred during the era of 
“modernization,” in the last several hundred years of world history.”4 Both challenges 
must be addressed. 
Chan and Williams’ concerns are misplaced for two reasons. First, the variety of 
revolutionary states should not affect a general theory given that, building off of Waltz’s 
theory, a diversity of content within a system still results in a similarity of outcome. 
While the richness of any historical case does result in a high degree of uniqueness, 
“[t]heory, as a general explanatory system, cannot account for particularities.”5 Structural 
Realism is concerned with generative structure – “the deeper structure levels  [that have] 
causal priority” which determines “the structural level closer to the surface of visible 
phenomena [that] take effect only within a context that is already “prestructured” by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  Charles A. Jones 1949-, Little Richard and Barry Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to 
Structural Realism (New York: New York : Columbia University Press, 1993).; Robert O. Keohane, 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 29.; Kenneth Neal Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979), 251.  
3  Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, Renegade States : The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign 
Policy (Manchester; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in 
the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1995) 199.  
4  Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 113.  
5  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118.  
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deeper level.”6 Accordingly, a generative structural theory can abstract away from the 
particularities of cases. Second, Chan and Williams believe the theoretic platform for 
understanding revolutions ‘at this early stage of their appreciation by International 
Relations’ is lacking. Here, the solution is simple – construct the theoretic platform. 
Doing so will facilitate a debate within the literature as to the deficiencies and necessary 
remedies for a general theory. The Structural Realist theory of revolution will do exactly 
this by producing a theoretic platform for explaining the state, power production, and 
change necessary to explain revolution.  
Skocpol, on the other hand, is not concerned with the wide variety of cases as 
much as their limited number, referring to the fact that, as Huntington succulently 
remarks, “Revolutions are rare.”7 Furthermore, she makes note that revolution is a 
distinctly modern phenomenon. While she is correct in both of these regards, she 
nevertheless draws the wrong conclusion. The infrequency of revolution only poses a 
problem to purely inductive theory building, which relies on drawing out descriptive 
structure through comparing a range of cases. In fact, hypothetico-deductive theory-
building with select induction can circumvent the methodological problem associated 
with a limited pool of cases, given that it is able to identify the causal variable(s) within 
the theoretical framework and logically trace it to the expected outcome.8 Such a theory 
can then be tested using a well-structured case study based on the before-after method 
supplemented by process tracing and within-case congruence procedure. This will reveal 
the validity of the theory.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” in  Keohane, Neorealism 
and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 150.  
7  Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968) 262.  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 1. 
8  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 7-13.  
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Additionally, Skocpol’s criticism of the modernity of revolution is irrelevant to 
the theory-building intention of this thesis. While the “no states, no revolutions” dictum 
holds true, the Structural Realist paradigm presupposes state-units, thus avoiding any 
theoretical disagreement.9 It could be added that, as the history of revolution in Chapter I 
suggests, the concept of revolution predates Antiquity. The modern concept of revolution 
discussed here is inevitably tied to modernity and the modern state; nonetheless, a pre-
modern proto-revolutionary structural rationalization mechanism existed prior to the 
modern state, as Perry Anderson and other neo-Marxist historian have illustrated.10 
Hence, to dismiss revolutions as modern phenomena is a mischaracterization; revolutions 
are merely the modern manifestation that emerged concomitantly with the nation-state.  
The Structural Realist theory of revolution being developed conceptualizes 
revolution as a self-correcting mechanism of the state-unit that is structurally determined. 
Revolution is defined as the rapid, basic transformation of the political and socio-
economic structure of an individual state that is accompanied and in part carried 
through by mass-based revolt from below. They occur when a structural contradiction 
forms between state and society, in which the dominat group or coalition in society 
obstructs the state, strained by its position in the International System, from realizing its 
capabilities. The suppression of state capability is self-corrected by the structural 
rationalization of state and society in revolution.  In fact, revolutionary structural 
rationalization substantially increases state-unit capabilities and thus alters the Balance of 
Power over time; hence, revolutions reshape the International System in the long-term. 
Critically, revolutions are not ‘made’ by agential forces; they are determined by structural !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Jeff Goodwin, “State-Centered Approaches to Revolution,” in John Foran, Theorizing Revolutions 
(London ; New York: London ; New York : Routledge, 1997) 14.  
10  Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: N.L.B, 1974).  
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conditions. Moreover, while structure determines the outcome of revolution, it does not 
address on the content of the outcome. As Goldstone observes, “Revolutions do not 
always feature the same set of key actors, nor do they all unfold in the same way.”11 
Regardless, the actors and events of revolutions do occur within the range defined by the 
existing generative structure. 
Due to the emphasis on generative structure, the theory offers syntactic simplicity, 
or elegance. Likewise, the ontological construction of the theory permits parsimony, 
although not the ‘ultra-parsimony’ of Waltz’s theory. Equifinality is avoided by 
developing the necessary and sufficient stages of revolution: international pressure, state-
society structural contradiction, state destruction, state reconstruction, consequential 
variation in power, and change in Balance of Power. The theory offers a high explanatory 
capacity, not only explicating revolutions but also reinforcing the concept of power and 
change in the Structural Realist paradigm. Additionally, it is prescriptive. To echo the 
cautionary note of economist Arthur Lewis, ““The process of social change is much the 
same today as it was 2,000 years ago… We can tell how change will occur if it occurs; 
what we cannot foresee is what change is going to occur.”12 In other words, the theory 
can prescribe the structural range of revolutionary change without answering what form it 
will take within the range. The Structural Realist theory of revolution will now be 
developed.  
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11  Jack Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," Annual Review of 
Political Science 4 (2001) 143.  
12  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
3.  
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A Structural Realist Theory of Revolution 
International Framework 
The International System is comprised of a collection of survival-seeking state-
units existing within anarchy, resulting in a self-help system. State-units are only 
distinguished by their capabilities, which must be understood comparatively.13 The 
differentiation of capabilities between interacting states generates a power structure – 
often referred to as the Balance of Power.14 Polarity, the “main pattern of relational 
power,” is defined by powerful or hegemonic state-units and gives shape to the 
International System.15 Through the dual structural mechanism of socialization (which 
reduces variety) and competition (which provides order) based on the threat or use of 
coercion, state-units conform to existing power realities. This does not assume behavioral 
rationality, although rational state-units emerge as a product of competition in anarchy 
given that irrational actors do not survive. 
 
Theory of the State 
 Power, as it has been said, is state capabilities viewed systemically. The source of 
state capabilities is left undefined in Neorealism, as it rejects explanatory reductionism 
where “the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its 
parts.”16 Yet, due to its ontological unit reductionism where the structure of the system is 
reduced to its units, the source of state capabilities becomes determinative of the whole 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Sprout, Margaret and Harold Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Van 
Nostrand, 1962) 164.  
14 Although it is the interaction of state-units that is generative to structure, it is abstracted away in the 
theory. 
15  Jones, Richard and Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy, 68.  
16  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 18.  
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International System.17 Accordingly, “there has been continuous pressure to push what 
Waltz counts as unit level factors back into the structural level.”18 William Wohlforth 
argues that although power “is systemic in [a] sense, the distribution of power is 
nonetheless partly the result of process internal to states that lie completely outside the 
purview of Waltz’s theory.”19 For this reason, many argue that Neorealism requires a 
theory of the state in order to become a true general theory of International Relations.20 
Waltz himself admits, “Realist theory by itself can handle some, but not all of the 
problems that concern us. Just as market theory at times requires a theory of the firm, so 
international-political theory at times needs a theory of the state.”21 He later further 
acknowledges, “Change in, and transformation of, systems originates not in the structure 
of a system but in its parts.”22 In order to reveal the source of state-unit power, which will 
be critical for theorizing revolutions, the International System must be tied to capability 
production inside the state-unit. Yet, as Maryam Panah comments, “one well-established 
complication with a theory that connects the International System with a intra-state 
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17 This is not exclusive of the Neorealist tradition. Sprout and Sprout similarly argues, without “super-
national world government,” it is nations that set the patterns of international politics. “For this reason, 
the role of national power is basic to any discussion of international politics.”  Sprout and Sprout, 
Foundations of National Power, 4.  See Halliday’s commentary on Waltz’s conception  Fred Halliday, 
Rethinking International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994) 125.  Also, see Richard Ashley for 
a full explanation of why “Neorealism is statist before it is structuralist.” Richard K Ashley, “The 
Poverty of Neorealism,” 272. 
18  Jones, Richard and Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy, 25.  
19 William C. Wohlforht, “Measuring Power – And the Power of Theories,” in  John A. Vasquez and 
Colin Elman, Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New DebateRecording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 
2005) 252.  
20  Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (Dec., 1989) 471.; Gilpin, War and Change in 
World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
15.  
21 Kenneth Waltz, “Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A response to My Critics,” 331. 
22 Ibid., 343. 
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system is the conceptualization of the state itself.”23A concept of the state must be 
forwarded that accounts for its dual role. 
The state will be defined as fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual 
anchorage in society and the International System.24  This understanding upholds an 
ontological duality of the state while recognizing a common convergence in state 
capability–the ultima ratio regum– that defines the state both international and intra-
national systems.25 It also notes that states are survival seeking in both contexts. In the 
International System, the state assumes the form of a simple “micro-decision unit.”26 
Everything within the territory of the state-unit, including society and capability 
production, is subsumed. Intra-territorially, the state is a macro-structure anchored in 
society that acts as a self-preserving coercive-administrative entity.27 The administrative 
capacity of the state over society has been demonstrated in Trimberger’s Revolution from 
Above and Stepan’s The State and Society where the state acts “not only to structure 
relationship between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure 
many crucial relationships within civil society as well.”28 Likewise, the fundamental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  Maryam H. Panah, "Social Revolution: The Elusive Emergence of an Agenda in International 
Relations," Review of International Studies 28, no. 02 (2002), 273.  
24 This is a modification of Skocpol’s definition.  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 32.  For the 
dual nature of state, see  G. J. Ikenberry, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno, The State and 
American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1988) 1-14.  
25 There are analyses that dissolve this ontological division to discuss an integrated world system with 
relations between sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. See Jan Scholte, International 
Relations of Social Change, (Open University Press, 1993), 25. 
26 This is the definition of a firm in a microeconomic model.  Morris Silver and Richard D. Auster, 
The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development (Boston:: M. Nijhoff Pub, 1979) 1.  
27 Halliday argues that the study of revolution produces the need of a “new, second, concept of the 
sate, a sociological category of the state as an administrative-coercive entity, in addition to the legal-
political one normally used in IR.”  Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Vancouver: 
Vancouver : UBC Press, 1994)140.  For a definition of means of administration (Verwaltungsmittel) 
and means of coercion or war (Kriegsmittel), see  Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, The Max 
Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts Stanford University Press, 2005) 163, 164.  
28 This presupposes state autonomy from society.  Alfred C. Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in 
Comparative Perspective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1978) xii. ;  
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coercive role of the state is readily recognized in the literature. Randall Collins finds that 
the state “consists ultimately of military control over a territory.”29 Similarly, Weber 
defines a state as the legitimate monopolization of force while Gilpin views the state as a 
legitimate actor that “provides protection and welfare in return for revenue.”30 
Legitimacy need not be included in the definition of state coercion, as many view the 
state “as a mechanism of domination and control,” especially within the neo-Marxist 
tradition.31 Instead of legitimation or domination, the emphasis must be on self-
preservation. 
The survival seeking state is defined by intra-territorial and extra-territorial 
competition.32 Consequently, the state performs two basic tasks: “It maintains order, and 
it competes with other actual or potential states.”33 That is, a state controls and defends its 
territory. Intra-territorially, as Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry contend, this “demands 
that the state meet and overcome challenges from, and maintain the support of, societal 
groups and coalitions.”34 This includes acting in both legitimate and dominating 
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Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, 
Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), 196.  
29  Randall Collins, "Some Princiiples of Long-Term Social Change: The Territorial Power of States," 
in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 1. ed. Louis Krisberg (Greenwich: Jai 
Press Inc., 1978) 1.  
30  Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber; an Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962) 418.;, 
Max Weber, Economy and Society ed. Bryan S. Turner and R. J. Holton (New York: Routledge, 1989) 
901-902. ; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 15. 
31  Stepan, The State and Society : Peru in Comparative Perspective, xii.  
32 In addition to intra-territorial and extra-territorial competition, what he labels ‘state making’ and 
‘war making’, Tilly adds protection of social clients and extraction as the four dimensions of the state. 
Yet, the protection of social clients can be reduced to an aspect of intra-territorial competition, akin to 
alliances in extra-territorial competitions. The state in its coercive capacity addresses intra- and extra-
territorial competition. The administrative capacity of the state addresses extraction. Hence, defining 
the state as a coercive-administrative entity captures the fundamental state activities.  Charles Tilly et 
al., War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 181.   
33  Theda Skocpol, "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, 
and China," Theory and Society 7, no. 1/2, Special Double Issue on State and Revolution (Jan. - Mar., 
1979) 30.  
34  Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, Toward a Realist Theory of State Action, 463-464.  
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capacities. Extra-territorially, the state must ensure its survival in an anarchic 
International System, as has been discussed. Critically, the ability to compete intra-
territorially and extra-territorially depends on state capabilities. These capabilities, in 
turn, depend on extraction from society. While the state may perform numerous other 
tasks and maintain additional interests, they are secondary or tertiary to the primary goal 
of survival. Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry note, “States do many things only 
tangentially related to survival,” yet “any state – whether pre-capitalist, capitalist, 
centrally planned, relatively autonomous, or wholly autonomous from society – must 
assure its survival (and that of its nation-state) prior to pursing other objectives.”35 
Accordingly, Skocpol finds, “Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from 
society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organization” 
(emphasis added).36 Given that the state is distinguished by its ability to survive intra-
territorial and extra-territorial competition, it is expected that the state is a semi-
autonomous actor. However, this conceptualization is at tension will much of the 
literature. 
When analyzed within a domestic system, the ontological salience of the state 
found in International Relations literature is often lost. Such is the case with the Pluralist 
and Liberal tradition, where the state acts as a legitimate political arena of social groups, 
thus reducing it to socioeconomic forces. Here, the state does not have unique interests. 
As a result, “the dominant theories and research agendas of social sciences rarely spoke 
of states.”37 This tendency is also evident in the neo-Marxist tradition. Marx originally 
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35  Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (Dec., 1989) 462.  
36  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 29.  
37  Peter B. Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 4.  
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viewed the state as superstructural epiphenomena that acts as “a committee for managing 
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”38 A noticeable shift occurred in neo-
Marxist thought during the mid-1960s that criticized, as Nicos Poulantzas formulated in 
the New Left Review, the “long Marxist tradition,” which assumes “the State is only a 
simple tool or instrument manipulated at will by the ruling class.”39 Still, even the more 
society-centric theories ran into the “inherent problems of choosing the appropriate level 
of interest aggregation and measuring the strength of various domestic groups.”40 
Overall, most neo-Marxists fail to provide a robust understanding of the state due to its 
tendency to view it exclusively through the lens of Capitalism. As Skocpol criticizes, “it 
won’t do to pretend that all states structures are themselves simply an aspect of an 
amorphous, all-encompassing “capitalism.”41 One strand has broken from the tradition to 
define the state as semi-autonomous.42  
The state, fundamentally Janus-Faced, is necessarily semi-autonomous. State 
autonomy is defined as “a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily 
equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of 
member groups in the polity.”43 It deserves to be emphasized that this does not link state 
interest to the interests of those holding authority, as Gilpin implies, or state officials, as 
Goodwin argues.44 On one hand, a state’s autonomy derives from its participation in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Engels, Friedrich, and Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto. (ePenguin, 2004), 221. 
39  Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58, no. 1 (1969) 47.  
40  Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, Toward a Realist Theory of State Action, 459.  
41  Theda Skocpol, "Capitalism Isn't Everything," Social Problems 28, no. 5 (Jun., 1981) 521.  
42 See Chapter 4 in Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (New York: Aakar Books, 2006).  
43  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 27.   
44 Gilpin states, “The state…has interest of its own” but these are later reduced to the interests of the 
authority.  Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 16.  Jeff Goodwin claims that the state-
autonomy perspective recognizes the tendency of state officials to “to “develop identities, interest, 
ideologies, and (ultimately) lines of action” that are distinct.” Jeff Goodwin. “State-Centered 
Approaches to Revolutions,” 12. 
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International System, which demands resource extraction that often creates conflict with 
the interests of the dominant class. In fact, as Otto Hintze reveals, “All state organization 
was originally military organization, organization for war.”45 This leads Tilly to 
formulate that “States are war-makers, and wars are state-makers.”46 Furthermore, a 
state’s determinant geopolitical environment constrains the range of state behavior. On 
the other hand, this autonomy is conditioned by the society within which it is embedded 
in. Hence, “the very structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time, 
as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both 
internally and in their relations to societal groups.”47 In short, the state is semi-
autonomous – determined extra-territorially by the geopolitical environment and 
conditioned intra-territorially by society, it is not reducible to either. 
 The state, as discussed above, is embedded in society. Society must be understood 
as the collection of classes with different resource-mobilizing capacities that is organized 
according to the relations of production. Following Weber, class “represents possible, and 
frequent, bases for social action.”48 While the interest of state and society often diverge 
on the extraction of resources from society, they converge on the necessity of territorial 
integrity from exogenous threats and the benefit of economic activity.49 Consequently, 
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45 Quoted in  Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic 
Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn, 1978) 897.  
46  Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" 446.  
47 Skocpol, “Explaining Social Revolutions: First and Further Thoughts,” in  Evans et al., Bringing the 
State Back In (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 14.  
48  Max Weber, Economy and Society, 927.  As a whole, society is the distribution of resources over a 
plurality of people, which has the potential for collection action. 
49 This is because “societies with states have had superior survival values to those without them.”  
Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 
European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 02 (1984) 119.  Additionally, as Jeffery Sellers explains, 
“Among a range of theoretical perspectives, scholars in the field have converged around a broadly 
similar conclusion that society provides crucial elements of support for a state to be effective, and that 
a state is critical to collective action in society.”  Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry believe this 
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the state-society relationship exists in a potential contentious positive-sum environment. 
In society, it is assumed that there is a dominant or elite structure. 
 
Capability Production 
State-unit capabilities – the “necessary conditions of state power” – are the 
product of material conditions within a territory realized through the state and society, or 
state-society.50 Separating the material condition and the structures of production and 
extraction enriches Waltz’s definition of capabilities – “population and territory, resource 
endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” – 
by unveiling their origin instead of merely measuring certain demonstrated outputs.51 The 
material conditions include geography, population, natural resources, and technology 
within the territory of the state.52 To be realized as capabilities, they must be mobilized 
by state-society.  
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represents a positive-sum relationship, where “By expanding wealth [in society], the state helps create 
the resources necessary to sustain military expenditures, stimulate technological innovation, and 
otherwise expand the political and economic bases of power.” Jeffery M. Sellers, “State-Society 
Relations Beyond the Weberian State,” (forthcoming in Mark Bevir (ed.), Handbook of Governance 
(London: Sage Publications). Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action, 463.  See Tilly for a historical account of how this has resulted in an increased capacity of the 
state to raise mobilize resources.  Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe,  (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975).  
50 Singer quoted in  Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," 
Comparative Political Studies (21, no. 1, 988) 46.  
51  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131.  
52 This definition provides the most basic foundation of power, which requires a production or 
mobilization level of analysis. Others have amalgamated the material base and the production into one 
level of factors. For example, Morgenthau includes geography, natural resources (e.g. food, raw 
materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership, quantity and quality of 
armed forces), population (distribution, trends), national character, national morale (quality of society 
and government), quality of diplomacy, quality of government. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics 
among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967) 124-159.  Gilpin argued 
accretive factors such as demography was most salient, but included organizational, technologic, 
economic, and military factors as well as the environmental factors of transpiration and 
communication; military technique and organization; economic factors.  Gilpin, War and Change in 
World Politics, 1981).  Likewise, Gurr defined the material base of state power as “national territory’s 
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Many authors have discussed the notion of realizing or mobilizing the material 
base in order to produce power, usually considering organizational variables. Gurr, for 
example, discusses the ‘political base’, or the “conditions that determine the extent to 
which the state apparatus and rulers are able to recruit, extract, and organize human and 
material resources, then use them coherently (efficiently over time) in the service of the 
state’s interests.”53 Likewise, Sprout and Sprout opine, “Manpower and economic 
resources are essential, but tools, skills, and organization are required to transmute them 
into political power and influence.”54 Yet, confusing factors such as aggregate skillsets 
and strategy can easily be avoided by examining structural rationality. State-society 
structural rationality is defined as the efficiency of the state-society structure in extracting 
and mobilizing its material endowment relative to other state-societies.55 Critically, the 
specific form is irrelevant to analysis; instead, it is solely efficiency relative to other 
state-units that matters. Through the dual structural mechanisms of competition and 
socialization, there is a pressure to maximize efficiency, including through emulating 
other state-societies.  It is important to note that what is structurally rational for one 
material condition may be structurally irrational for another. Overall, material conditions 
and state-society structural rationalization determines state-unit capabilities. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
raw materials, population, energy and steel production, and military establishment” In addition to this, 
he adds an international base, which he describes as the “variable but usually limited extent, states can 
enhance their capabilities by drawing on external resources from other states: money, human skills, 
military aid.” An international condition would be a useful supplement to the theory’s material 
condition if the phenomena of imperialism and more recently globalization was to be explained. 
Nevertheless, the international base is not included as it correlates to a more superficial structural level.  
Gurr, War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State, 46.  
53  Ted Robert Gurr "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," 46.  
54  Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, 29.  Also see  Skocpol, States and Social 
Revolutions, 22.  
55 This differs from the behavioral rationality that arises as a structural-function of Waltz’s system-
theory. 
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Change 
The framework developed above is static, much like Waltz’s own theory.56  An 
explanation of change is necessary for a Structural Realist theory of revolution. However, 
explaining change has always been a problem for the social sciences.57 John Keynes once 
declared, “The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of 
population and other fundamental economic causes, which, escaping by their gradual 
character and notice of contemporary observers, are attributed to the follies of statesmen 
or the fanaticism of atheists.”58 He reveals the fundamental nature of change here; 
namely, it results from deep macro-structural trends. Ralph Hawtrey offers another 
insight: 
“Changes in relative power are always occurring. Without any extension 
of territory or similar overt act, the natural growth of population and 
wealth and the march of economic progress will bring about a greater 
increase of power in one country than in another. And while some 
countries are growing stronger in unequal degrees, others may stand still 
or may actually decay.”59 
 
The deep macro-structural change that occurs within the territory of the state has 
profound ramifications for the International System. In order to theorize change within 
the International System, transformational trends in the basic material conditions of the 
state must first be examined. 
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56 As it has been above developed, change in a systems-theory must come from the unit-level; yet, 
Waltz argues structure is the productive agent and hence abstracts away from the state-unit. 
Consequently, Waltz cannot explain change. William Wohlforth provides the compelling reasoning 
that, “Because Waltz’s theory does not account for changes in the distribution of capabilities that 
occur as a consequence of domestic processes, it might be irrelevant for significant stretches of 
international history and seems to be flat wrong about others.” William C. Wohlforht, “Measuring 
Power – And the Power of Theories,” in  John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, Realism and the 
Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2005) 252. 
57  Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," 283.  
58  John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Howe, 1920) 14.  
59  R. G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty (London: Longmans, Green, 1952) 74.  
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The material condition of a state-unit changes according to deep demographic, 
environmental, economic and technological macro-structural trends.60 These deep 
structures tend to change extremely gradually; nevertheless, by changing they alter the 
material condition within a state-unit, often system-wide. Change in the material 
condition necessitates adaption in state-society structure in order to remain rational, or 
efficient in extracting and mobilizing its material endowment relative to other state-
societies. To elaborate, what was rational in efficiently extracting and mobilizing 
resources in material condition n1 may not be in material condition n2. Furthermore, there 
exists the structural pressure to maximize rationalization. Failure to adapt will be rectified 
through intra-territorial and extra-territorial threats to survival, or ‘competition’. 
Consequently, state-society must adapt their structure to efficiently extract from material 
condition n2. The logic of adaption, whether in innovation or emulation, is intrinsic to 
Neorealism and is manifested in the isomorphic tendencies of socialization to the 
system.61 Due to competition and socialization, it is structurally determined that change 
will be adapted to over time. This is normal change and results in a gradual variation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 This concept is similar to the Marxist ‘forces of production’. Still, one must be careful not to reduce 
capability production to the mode of production. It is evident that, as Collins formulated, “Productive 
economies have proportionately greater surplus for investment in war equipment, larger populations, 
and greater proportions of the population freed for military action.”  Randall Collins, "Some Principles 
of Long-Term Social Change: The Territorial Power of States," 1. Gilpin falls into this trap when he 
agues, “the distribution of power itself ultimately rests on an economic base, and as sources and 
foundations of wealth change because of shifts in economic efficiency, location of industry, or 
currents of trade, a corresponding redistribution of power among groups and states necessarily occurs.”  
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 67.  Yet, capability production requires more than 
economic activity; specifically, it requires the state’s effective coercive-administration of society (i.e., 
order) and the extraction of societal resources. E. H. Carr found, “the science of economic 
presupposes a given political order, and cannot be profitably studied in isolation from politics.”  E. H. 
Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956) 117.  
61 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127-128. Socialization may cause a state-society to emulate 
another efficient state-society structure. Skocpol indicates, “From the start, international relations have 
intersected with preexisting class and political structures to promote and shape divergent as well as 
similar changes in various countries.”  Skocpol, State and Revolution, 20.   
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capabilities and thus power relations in the International System. With the exception of 
revolution, a Structural Realist theory can abstract away from change-adaption dynamics 
as the logic of structure results in states adapting to increase capabilities given pressures 
from the International System. It follows that the state can be abstracted from save with 
revolutionary cases. 
 
Revolution 
 Revolutions occur when state-society structure does not adapt to deep structural 
trends.62 Yet, according to the theoretic framework, the structural mechanism of 
competition in intra- and extra-territorial competition acts to ensure that state-society 
does structurally adapt to deep structural change. Accordingly, revolutions can only arise 
when state-society adaption to change is inhibited by a structural contradiction between 
the state and society. The state, already strained from the International System, becomes 
fundamentally incompatible with a high resource-mobilizing section of the 
socioeconomic structure, which obstructs its extraction from and administration of 
society. Usually, this would be the elite structure given its greater resource-mobilizing 
capacity. Still, a non-elite coalition can form to fill this role – key is the structurally 
determined incompatibility that leads social resource-mobilization against strained state 
capabilities.63 The structural incompatability cannot be rectified. This results in depressed 
state capabilities and, thus, the state’s inability to counter intra-territorial threats. As will 
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62 As case studies will reveal, state-society structure may be adjusting without necessarily adapting, 
which entails rationalization. 
63 The elite-centric conclusions found in comparative studies of the ‘Classic Revolutions’ proved 
inaccurate with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This highlights the problems of a purely inductive 
general theory. 
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be explained below, revolution removes this structural contradiction, allowing for state-
unit self-correction.  
The international dimension of analysis must be retained, for, in the words of 
Gourevitch, “the outbreak and outcome of… revolutions is unintelligible without an 
examination of international factors.”64 Strain on a state’s capabilities due to pressure 
from the International System is a necessary condition for revolution.65 This explains 
why revolutions have only occurred in states situated in disadvantageous positions within 
the International System.66 Formulated another way, the extra-territorial pressures that 
demand and expend state capabilities – the preparation for international conflicts, the 
threat of invasion, arms races, defeat in war, et cetera – reduces the amount of 
capabilities that can be devoted to intra-territorial competition, providing a permissive 
condition. Skocpol found, “Although uneven economic development always lies in the 
background, developments within the international states system as such – especially 
defeat in wars or threats of invasion and struggles over colonial control – have directly 
contributed to virtually all outbreaks of revolutionary crisis.”67 Yet, war and competition 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64  Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," 900.  
65 Goldfrank labeled this a ‘permissive world context’ whereas Foran uses the term ‘world systemic 
opening Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution without Theory: The Case of 
Mexico," Theory and Society 7, no. 1/2, (Jan. - Mar., 1979) 142.;  John Foran, "The Comparative-
Historical Sociology of Third World Social Revolutions: Why a Few Succeed, Why Most Fail," in 
Foran, Theorizing Revolutions (London ; New York: Routledge, 1997b), 222. Pressures can originate 
from society itself to supplement exogenous pressures. Eric Wolf illustrates the case of endogenous 
pressures using data on population growth that suggests doubling or tripling of growth rates prior to 
peasant wars; he finds, “social structures often failed to absorb the added burden of supernumerary 
claimants.” Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) 
281.  
66  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 23. ; Examples from Latin America, Middle East, and Asia 
have illustrated that revolutions actually act a balancing behavior against system hegemons. Skocpol, 
"Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," 158.  
67 Skocpol, The State and Social Revolution, 23. 
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in the International System are common whereas revolutions are rare.68 This is because, 
even when strained by exogenous pressures, the state possesses far greater capabilities 
than found in society divided by class.69 In addition to exogenous pressure, revolutions 
require a contradiction between the state and society. 
 Pressure from the International System necessitates that a state ensures state-
society structural rationalization in order to maximize capabilities. According to the 
theoretic framework, changing material conditions requires adaption of state-society 
structures in order to be rationalized for the new material condition. However, this is not 
possible when the state’s rationalization of extraction or the administrative reordering of 
socioeconomic structure becomes incompatible with the structure of the dominant group 
or coalition of society. Specifically, a contradiction forms when the range of options 
structurally determined for the state is incompatible with the range of options structurally 
determined for the dominant group or coalition of society. This not only depresses state 
capability, but also undermines socioeconomic structure.70 When the crisis becomes 
sufficiently acute, the dominant class or coalition obstructs state extraction, coercion, and 
administration, producing state-society irrationality hence depressed capabilities. As a 
result, the state succumbs to intra-territorial competition, or, in a word, revolution.  
The state-society structural contradiction is dissimilar to the Marxist version of 
structural contradiction that results between the forces of production and the relations of 
production. Here, the Marxist tradition holds that the political crisis of revolution is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 See  John Foran, "The Comparative-Historical Sociology of Third World Social Revolutions," 227.  
69  Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution," 448.  
70 Richard Lachmann upholds that “revolutions matter structurally only when they extinguish, 
amalgamate, or destroy elite capacities.” While this elite-exclusive explanation is one sided, it 
highlights the role of elite structure in revolution. Ricahrd Lachmann, “Agents of Revolution: Elite 
Conflicts and Mass Mobilization from the Medici to Yeltsin,” in Theorizing Revolutions, ed. John 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 96. 
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epiphenomenal to class antagonism. Yet, Skocpol notes how “Marxist scholars have 
failed to notice that causal variables referring to the strength and structure of states and 
the relation of state organizations to class structure may discriminate between cases of 
successful revolution and cases of failed or nonoccurrence far better than do variables 
referring to class structures and patterns of economic development alone.”71 Furthermore, 
the theory does not claim that revolutions result from change alone. This breaks from the 
modernization literature that holds the rate of modernization correlates to the degree of 
stability.72 Pitirim Sorokin’s extensive longitudinal study rejects any direct correlation 
between change and instability. Likewise, the twentieth century abounds with cases of 
rapid social and political transformation that did not result in revolution, such as with 
post-World War II South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Zaire, Argentina, and 
elsewhere.73 In short, revolutions are the product of change only when it leads to a 
structural contradiction, and only when this structural contradiction is between state and 
society, which ultimately leads to depressed state capabilities allowing intra-territorial 
competition to succeed.  
The depression of state capabilities creates a systemic opportunity that, in the 
context of intra-territorial competition, is ultimately realized in the destruction of the 
state. Amann holds, “revolution prevails when the state’s monopoly of power is 
effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is re-established.”74 State 
destruction is a violent process in that it destroys political institutions and later the 
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71 Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 116. 
72 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 45. 
73 John Foran, “The Comparative-Historical Sociology of Third World Social Revolutions,” 227. 
74 Amann, “Revolutions: A Redefinition,” 39. Consistent with this definition, Friedrich argues, 
“Revolution, when successful, signalizes the death of one political order and the emergence of a new 
one.” Friedrich, Pathology of Politics, 55. 
!!
87!
87!
socioeconomic structure as well. Forrest Colburn notes the “sudden, violent, and drastic” 
nature of revolutions in which a “group formerly excluded from the government” 
captures the foci of state power and then engages in an “assault on state and society for 
the purpose of radically transforming society.”75 Similarly, Mark Katz offers an empirical 
analysis where he concludes that the agents themselves “partly get rid of whatever 
political or economic system [they] object to, and to replace it with an alternate 
system.”76 Tilly’s conceptualization of multiple polities may be the most useful analytic 
tool for examining this period. However, the theory can abstract away from the dynamics 
and politics of the interregnum period since the contradiction between state and society 
necessarily leads to state-society structural rationalization through revolution.77  
State reconstruction is the organic development of the state and socioeconomic 
structure in the institutional vacuum where relations between units are rationalized 
according to the material condition. It would be overly simplistic to not recognize that 
“the class and economic structures of the prerevolutionary society set certain constrains 
on post-revolutionary state building.”78 Yet, the rationalizing-adaption process in non-
revolutionary state-societies is similarly constricted to a far greater extent by solidified 
existing state and socioeconomic structures. Given that state and socioeconomic 
structures are destroyed in revolution, the normal barriers to state-society rationalization 
are removed. Thus, not only does revolution remove the structural contradiction between 
state and society, it allows state-society to attain a remarkable high degree of structural 
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75 Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries, 6. 
76  Katz, Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves, 8. 
77 While in theory the interregnum can be abstracted from, casework should process-trace through this 
period. 
78  Jack A. Goldstone, “An Analytical Framework,” in Mark Katz, Revolution: International 
Dimensions (Washington, D.C. : CQ Press, 2010). 
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rationalization. State reconstruction begins with the consolidation phase of a revolution 
and “often spans decades” afterwards.79 
 During this time, a state is increasingly able to extract material resources and 
mobilize the population, thus increasing capabilities. Empirical work has found that 
revolutions “have given birth to nations whose power and autonomy, markedly surpassed 
their own prerevolutionary pasts and outstripped other countries in similar 
circumstances.”80  Often cited is the post-revolutionary increase of ‘infrastructural power’ 
– also known as organizational reach, which refers to a state’s ability to penetrate into 
society.81 Chan and Williams have come to a similar conclusion: “The effect of such a 
revolutionary transformation has often been the long-term strengthening of the state 
through the mass mobilization of the population under its control.”82 In other words, 
state-society structural rationalization allows the state to mobilize a greater section of the 
society. This explains the post-revolutionary “mobilization of citizen support across class 
lines for protracted international warfare.”83 Yet, post-revolutionary rationalization 
affects more than just population mobilization. Tilly found that revolutions put “resources 
at the disposal of the state which were simply unavailable before the revolution: property, 
energy, information, loyalties.”84 In particular, state means of coercion and administration 
are greatly reinforced by revolution, which allows it to impose order on intra-territorial 
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79  Ibid., 10. For the “consolidation” phase, see Calvert, Revolution and International Politics, 21. 
80  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 3. 
81 Infrastructural power was coined by Michael Mann. Jeff Goodwin, “State-Centered Approaches to 
Revolution,” 13. 
82 Chan and Williams, Renegade States, 26. 
83  Skocpol, Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization, 150.  
84  Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: New York : McGraw-Hill, 1978) 221-
222.  
!!
89!
89!
competition. In short, revolutions are about state building.85 Still, this process occurs over 
time. The state in statu nascendi has depressed capabilities.86 It is only in the long-term 
that state capabilities substantially increase. 
 There is long-standing sub-strain of theoretical thought that notes the 
strengthening of the state in revolutions, refuting popular misperceptions of post-
revolution weakness. This tradition dates back to Alexis de Tocqueville, who observed in 
1856 that “centralization was salvaged from the ruins and restored … [as] a power more 
extensive, more minute, and more absolute than [the] kings had ever exercised (emphasis 
added).”87  Max Weber elaborated on this with his notion of routinization and 
rationalization of informal revolutionary charisma into the formal and permanent 
structure of bureaucracy.88  More recently, Samuel Huntington adopted this logic in his 
explanation of revolution as modernization, suggesting that revolutions enhance popular 
involvement in the national political realm – increasing a state’s ability to mobilize its 
manpower and extract resources.89 Finally, Theda Skocpol suggested that revolutions are 
a process of resynchronization that leads to “more bureaucratized and centralized 
states.”90 These different conceptualizations – whether it is centralization, routinzation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85  Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution; Tilly, Ardant ,The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe.; Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," 147-168.  
86  Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War, 21. ; Tilly contends that specifically the “efficiency of 
government coercion is likely to decline, at least in the short run. Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed 
Revolution?” 443.   
87 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, Ed. Jon Elster and Arthur 
Goldhammer, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 183. 
88 Weber argued that irrational revolutionary charisma was maintained only in the form of ritual. He 
also introduced the notion that the further bureaucratization of states will make revolutions 
increasingly less likely. Max Weber et al., The Russian Revolutions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), 175-180. 
89  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 488.  
90 Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," 48-49; and Theda Skocpol and 
Ellen Trimberger, “Revolutions: A Structural Analysis,” in Jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: 
Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Belmont, Calif. ; London: Wadsworth, 2002), 68. 
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and rationalization, modernization, or resynchronization – recognize the same 
fundamental causal role that revolutions have in reconstituting state power. 
According to the theoretic framework, the increased rationalization of state-
society results in greater state capabilities over time. From the international perspective, 
as state-unit capabilities increase, it improves its position in the Balance of Power. Post-
revolutionary state-unit behavioral deviation is rectified through systemic socialization, 
maintaining the homeostasis of the International System. It would be incorrect, as 
Halliday remarks, if “the lesson drawn [were] that even revolution cannot duck the 
system.”91 The post-revolutionary increase of state capabilities over time alters the 
distribution of capabilities system-wide, thus restructures the International System. This 
type of “structural change is a revolution” for the International System, explains Waltz, 
“because it gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by 
the acts and interactions of units whose placement in the system varies with changes in 
structure.” Elsewhere he formulates, “Structural thought conceives of actions 
simultaneously taking place within a matrix. Change the matrix – the structure of the 
system  -- and expected actions and outcomes are altered.”92 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Structural Realist theory of revolution proposed is based on two units – state 
and society. First, the state is defined by three features: (a) it is security-seeking; (b) it is 
distinguished by its capabilities; and (c) it exists extra-territorially in an International !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91  Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994) 125.  
92  Kenneth Waltz, “Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A response to My Critics,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 344. 
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System and intra-territorially in a society. Second, society is defined as a collection of its 
sub-units – classes – with the dual feature of resource-mobilization and self-interest. The 
theory also makes a certain number of assumptions. First, an International System is 
assumed to be anarchic and comprised only of state-units.93 Second, capabilities are 
assumed to be material conditions realized through the structure of the two units – state 
and society. No assumption of structural rationality is necessary since it is a function of 
structure.94 Third, it is assumed that material condition change according to deep macro-
structural trends.95 This framework is supplemented with two inductions: first, the state 
acts as a coercive-administrative entity intra-territorially; second, there is a dominant or 
elite class in society. 
 Revolutions can be explained within this framework. The state, seeking security 
and positioned in both the International System and the socioeconomic structure, is 
determined a range of options. Similarly, the dominant class or coalition, seeking self-
interest and rooted between other classes and the state, is determined a range of options. 
When the structurally determined range of state and dominant group action are 
incompatible – that is, when their self-interest in maintaining the means of survival is 
incompatible, capabilities for the state and resources for society, a structural contradiction 
forms that inhibits rational extraction of material conditions. Capabilities – the function 
of material condition and state-society structural rationalization – depress. The state, 
without capabilities, cannot fulfill its security-seeking goal in the intra-territorial system. 
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93 State-unit is defined as the state with its third feature – being dually anchored – removed. This 
should not be considered a third unit of analysis; rather, it is the first unit partially represented 
94 That is, the structural mechanism of socialization and competition determine state-society structural 
rationalization.  
95 Once again, state-society adaption to change is a function of structure and does not have to be 
assumed.  
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Revolution removes the structural contradiction by destroying and recreating state and 
socioeconomic structure. With the structural contradiction removed, state-society 
rationality returns as a function of the structure. State-unit capabilities increase as a 
result, improving the state-unit’s position in the Balance of Power. 
This Structural Realist theory of revolution suggests a number of solutions to 
some of the ‘riddles’ confronting realism. First, it answers why a survival-seeking state-
unit destroys itself. As specified by the theory, revolutions can be considered a 
mechanism for reconstituting state power.  Revolutionary self-destruction, which creates 
a short-term window of opportunity, results in increased capabilities and thus allows a 
state-unit to survive in the International System in the long-term. Furthermore, it does so 
while maintaining territorial integrity. Second, the consequential increase of state-unit 
capabilities that, over time, redefines the structure of the International System is 
explained by the state-society structural rationalization, which can occur unobstructed 
during a revolution. Third, as Halliday suggests, the “combined study of the international 
and revolution may help to clarify… the relationship between structure and change.”96 
The theory offers one interpretation of the relationship by tying deep macro-structural 
tends in material conditions and state-society structural rationalization through state-unit 
capabilities to change in the International System.  
Finally, the theory of revolutions developed focuses within a single state-unit, 
tying change in the state-unit to change in the International System. However, it may be 
useful to examine it from a system-wide view. The deep macro-structural trends are 
transnational and hence affect the material condition of state-units system-wide. Since the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96  Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham, 
NC: Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1999) 7.  
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structural contradiction between state and society that give rise to revolutions occur when 
changing material conditions alter their relationship, it follows that periods of great deep 
macro-structural change would increase the likelihood of revolution. Consequently, 
periods of great deep macro-structural change alter the state-unit capabilities system-wide 
and are more likely lead to revolution. This is explanatory of periods of great systemic 
change where the Balance of Power is redefined. A system-wide view of revolution can 
offer an answer to the final riddle; as Kim inquires, “If some periods in history are 
characterized by a greater stability than others, the question naturally arises: What 
accounts for it?”97 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97  Kyŏng-dong Kim, Revolution and International System (New York: New York University Press, 
1970) 117.  
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Chapter V: Defense and Implication of Theory 
 A Structural Realist theory of Revolution has been proposed. There are numerous 
tensions that arise out of connecting two traditions as disparate as Realism and 
Revolution Studies. The difference between the two traditions can be tied to the greater 
gap between the Comparative and International Relations branch of Political Science 
concerning anything from the nature of the state, power, and change to the agent-
structure dichotomy, the role of history, and the linkage between the domestic and 
international. Inevitably, many of these challenges face any theory that attempts to tie the 
two traditions together. By connecting the intra-territorial and the extra-territorial systems 
through a Janus-Faced state, many of the potential complications were avoided. 
Nevertheless, several topics must still be addressed: the agent-structure dichotomy; 
ideology; ahistoricism and the state; and revolution and war. 
 
Agent-Structure Dichotomy 
 Revolutions are often considered highly agential phenomena. While true of 
popular conceptions, this tendency has also found its way into scholarly works – for 
example both the realist Kissinger and the comparativist Gurr wrote about the causal role 
of dissatisfaction or discontent. People, the intuitive argument goes, revolt when they are 
dissatisfied with their current condition. Yet discontents are a historical constant whereas 
revolutions are a rarity. As Leon Trosky put it, “in reality the mere existence of privation 
is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would be always in revolt.”1 
Likewise, James Scott maintains, “if anger born of exploitation were sufficient to spark a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the Triumph of the Soviets, ed. 
F. W. Dupee (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 353. 
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rebellion, most of the Third World (and not only the Third World) would be in flames.”2 
Pointedly, examining discontent cannot explain the normative quiescence of oppressed 
populations. Even when quiescence is abandoned, discontent proves insufficient to 
produce revolution. It may be asked why the numerous peasant revolts failed to produce 
revolution in France until 1789, why the Russian revolution failed in 1905 but succeeded 
in 1917, or how Imperialist China could exist unchallenged for centuries prior to the 
Communist overthrow. The answer, which Skocpol provides, is simple: “historically, 
mass rebellious action has not been able, in itself, to overcome state repression.”3 The 
capabilities necessary for the state to exist in the International System ensures a dramatic 
asymmetry of resources over society, which is divided by class and dominated by an elite 
structure. The profound reduction in state capability provides the necessary systemic 
opportunity for revolutionary intent to become actualized. 
 In fact, it is not necessary that a revolutionary intent must precede the systemic 
opportunity allotted by the structural contradiction between state and society. The 
structural contradiction between state and society necessarily provokes a mobilized mass. 
Crane Brinton argued that the most critical factor of mobilization is “that prevailing 
conditions limit or hinder [groups] economic activity.”4  Structural contradiction 
depresses economic activity, negatively affecting society as well as the state. 
Additionally, “the conditions that give rise to state breakdown” claims Jack Goldstone, 
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2 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 4. 
3  Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory and Society 11, no. 
3 (May, 1982) 226. 
4 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 33. 
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“also give rise to a widespread perception that something has “gone wrong” in society.” 5 
They, in a sense, limit the conscious intention of actors. Many authors, even from the 
structuralist tradition, would argue otherwise, claiming that an action-oriented 
discontented population or a high mobilization potential is a separate variable for 
revolution.6 Yet, mobilization arguments require a descriptive reductionist approach that 
eludes measurement. This is avoidable. Implicit in the logic of structure is that structure 
determines the range of behavior.  As such, agent mobilization is a necessarily function 
of the structural contradiction between state and society – although agential 
considerations ultimately decide what occurs within the structurally determined range of 
outcomes. 
 The role of  agent intentionality in ultimately shaping the form and content of 
revolution and its outcome within the structural limits is the matter of a socio-historical 
analysis of revolution. For the purpose of the theory, it is only necessary to dismiss that 
revolutions are ‘made’ by intentional actors. Intention does not produce revolutions. “In 
fact,” Jeremy Brecher found, “revolutionary movements rarely [even] begin with a 
revolutionary intention; this only develops in the course of the struggle itself.”7 
Moreover, history has proven how revolutionary ‘intent’ has radically shifted between 
largely contradictory goals during the revolution. “The purposes of men, especially in a 
revolution,” Gordon Wood conveys, “are so numerous, so varied, and so contradictory 
that their complex interaction produces results that no one intended or could even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Univ of California Press, 1991), 
419. 
6 See Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, 
and the Philippines, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
 10 
7  Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (San Francisco: San Francisco Straight Arrow Books; distributed by World 
Pub. Co., New York, 1972) 240. 
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foresee.”8 The purposeful view of revolution that relies on the notion of conscious action 
overlooks how the environment conditions consciousness. Goldstone demonstrates how 
structural environment produces conscious action:  
Changing macro-level conditions, such as deteriorating access to jobs, 
falling real incomes, or heightened elite competition for positions, can 
produce accusations of both injustice and ineffectiveness. [This leads to] 
changing micro-level conditions, such as spreading perceptions of regime 
vulnerability and of solidarity within and across networks, [which] can 
persuade people to act against a regime.9 
 
Furthermore, the purposeful view implies that societal order rests on the conscious 
acceptance by the majority.  
 Structural determinacy is problematic when viewed in an absolutist sense. Yet, to 
do so would be untrue to its original meaning. Drawing from the Latin determinare – “to 
enclose, bound, set limits to” – determinacy should imply the limits on possible 
outcomes.10 This retains the importance of agency within these bounds. Furthermore, 
structure can only realized indirectly through agents. Tilly argues, “large-scale structural 
changes [act] … indirectly, by shaping the potential contenders for power, transforming 
the techniques of governmental control, and shifting the resources available to contenders 
and governments.”11 Waltz similarly noted its indirect nature: “In itself a structure does 
not directly lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within the 
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8  Theda Skocpol, "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, 
and China," Theory and Society 7, no. 1/2, Special Double Issue on State and Revolution (Jan. - Mar., 
1979a) 18. 
9  Jack Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," Annual Review of Political 
Science 4 (2001) 173. 
10 “determine (v.),” Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed April 3, 2013, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=determine&allowed_in_frame=0 
11  Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" Comparative Politics 5, no. 3, Special 
Issue on Revolution and Social Change (Apr., 1973a) 447. 
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system, but does so indirectly.”12 The structural mechanism of competition and 
socialization are critical in linking agent behavior to structural limits. In The 18th 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx appropriately articulates the agent-structure balance: 
“Men make their own history, but do not make it just as they please…”13 In short, 
structure determines the range of outcomes, within which agency alone can explain. Yet, 
the particularities produced by agents, while important socio-historically, do not affect 
the coming of revolution, nor do they explain the post-revolutionary impact on power 
structure. 
 
 
Ideology 
 Ideology is often tied to revolution. Eric Selbin, in a rejection of the one-sided 
structural approach, vigorously defends the notion that “revolutions do not come, they are 
made.”14 While acknowledging that structural conditions create the limits of 
mobilization, Selbin argues, “people’s thoughts and actions – even if haphazard or 
spontaneous – are the mediating link between structural conditions and social 
outcomes.”15 This agency-centered approach depends on ideology derived from ‘popular 
political culture’, which encompasses cultural symbolism and collective memory.  
Accordingly to this view, proper ideology is a prerequisite to mass mobilization. For this, 
it is critical that popular grievances are articulated in a diagnostic frame that appeals to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 
1979) 74. 
13 Marx, Karl. The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (Wildside Press, 2008) 15. 
14 Eric Selbin. “Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In.” in Theorizing Revolution, 
ed John Foran (New York : Routledge, 1997) 133. 
15 Ibid., 126. 
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the popular political culture. Furthermore, a successful ideology must provide a 
prognostic frame in which an alternative or solution to the current problems are 
addressed. 
 Numerous comparativist authors have commented the predictive and explanatory 
weakness of ideology.16 Wickham-Crowley bashes cultural and ideological approaches 
for their reactionary explanation of revolution – this is to say, their inability to explain 
why “n = 1” – and their regional uniqueness, which resists comparative studies. From 
within International Relations, Morgenthau criticized, “It is a characteristic of all politics, 
domestic as well as international, that frequently its basic manifestation do not appear as 
what they actually are – manifestations of a struggle for power… the true nature to the 
policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations.”17 Neither the 
ideology as causal nor the ideology as excuse approach is convincing. 
 Ideology cannot be understood as an independent force. Nevertheless, it can 
greatly influence agential forces within the structural limits.  Sewall convincingly calls 
for “a structural, anonymous, and transpersonal analysis of ideology.”18 Walt defines 
ideology as “a normative theory of action.” He goes on explain, “Ideologies “explain” 
prevailing social conditions and provide individuals with guidelines for how to react to 
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16 See the chapter 7, “The Withering Away of an Idea” in Forrest D. Colburn, The Vogue of 
Revolution in Poor Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Jack A. Goldstone, 
Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 
417-421 
17  Barry Hoffman donor and Hans Joachim Morgenthau 1904-, Politics among Nations; the Struggle 
for Power and Peace (New York: New York, Knopf, 1967) 99. 
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11, no. 1 (Mar., 1993) 9.; Peter B. Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge 
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them.”19 Additionally, they are important for transferring politico-social agendas and 
group-formation. Still, to judge the cognitive content of ideology as any way 
determinative would be greatly misplaced. 
 
 
Change, Ahistoricism, and the State 
 Neorealism has repeatedly been charged with ahistoricism.20 Richard Ashley 
asserts, “Neorealist structuralism denies history as process.”21 This is inherently tied to 
the lack of change evident in Neorealism. Waltz finds that historicism is unnecessary for 
the “texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and event 
repeat themselves endlessly.”22 While the historic particularities change, the fundamental 
system does not. Ruggie counters, “One problem with [this conception] is that it provides 
no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual 
change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the 
modern international system.”23  
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19  Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996a) 25.For an in-
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Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays Basic Books, 1973), 193-233. 
20  Charles A. Jones 1949-, Little Richard and Barry Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to 
Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 10.; Robert Cox, “Social Forces, 
States and World Order,” in  Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986) 216-217.; Rob BJ Walker, "History and Structure in the Theory of International 
Relations," Millennium-Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989), 163-183.; Alexander Wendt, 
"The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 
3 (1987), 335-370. 
21  Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in  Keohane, 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 290. 
22  Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979) 66. 
23John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” in  Keohane, Neorealism 
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Neorealism struggles to explain this shift due to its inability to capture change and 
what can be termed the ‘problem of the Feudal state’.24 Most fundamentally, the Feudal 
state cannot be conceived of as a sovereign unit as it consisted of a loose network of lord-
vassal relationships based on the fief.25 It was not until the Modern state when property 
became the basis of social organization that this became possible. Bull recounts how 
sovereign exclusiveness derived from “the tendency to make us of the Roman-law notion 
of dominium or private property, with its implication that a territory and its people are the 
patrimony of the ruler.”26 Additionally, capabilities as stipulated in Structural Realism are 
descriptive of the modern nation-state, and thus struggle to capture the Feudal system. 
Consequently, the argument goes, Neorealism can only explain modernity. Waltz’s 
response is a convincing one, albeit incomplete. He responds: 
“I would be surprised if many different sorts of unit-level changes did not 
alter systemic outcomes. Ruggie says that I omit such forces. Yet I define 
a system as consisting of a structure and of interacting units. The question 
is not one of omission but of the level at which one sees such forces 
operating. Changes in some or in all units will make their relations harder, 
or easier, to manage.27 
 
His explanation makes Neorealism seem like a reactive theory while profound system-
level change remains undefined given its unit-level origin.  
The theoretic platform of the state and change developed here could prove useful 
in filling this gap. First, the two inductive assumptions of the theory must be dismissed – 
the state as a coercive-administrative entity and the existence of a dominant class. In the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See  Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State : A Sociological Introduction 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978) 26. 
25 See Joseph Reese Strayer , Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1971). 
26  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977) 30. 
27 Kenneth Waltz, “Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A response to My Critics,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 327. 
!!
102!
102!
Feudal system, given the loose association, exogenous pressures were low. Consequently, 
there was minimal pressure to rationalize political units. As the change in material 
conditions prompted political unit restructuring towards the Absolutist states form, 
exogenous pressures began to increase for all territorial entities.28 Resulting from the 
increased system’s level competition, there was a rationalization of structure, which was 
similar in form due to socialization. The move from the Absolutist state to the modern 
state with the French Revolution is captured by the Structural Realist theory of 
revolution. After the fall of the ancien régime and the emergence of a powerful new 
French state, the resulting increase of pressure in the International System necessitated a 
similar rationalization of structure for all units.  
Gilpin’s simplification partly conveys why the modern nation-state replaced 
feudal, city-state, and imperial forms of organization – “it was simply more efficient, 
given the changed economic and military environment.”29 While the application of the 
developed framework to this question fails to explain the specific historical forms, it does 
succeed in explaining why certain forms were socialized across the system (i.e., structural 
rationality – efficiency in mobilizing the material condition – under exogenous pressures) 
and others where not (i.e. structural irrationality). Furthermore, it provides an explanation 
for the change in structure (i.e. shifting material conditions and increased exogenous 
pressure). This is enough to continue to explain shifts in the structural limits of outcome 
at the systems-level despite change over the millennium.  
In fact, the question of state form often comes into question with revolution, 
explaining a good deal of tension between International Relations and Revolution !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See  Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: N.L.B, 1974).  
29  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
121. 
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Studies. Whereas Waltz dismisses the content of the state for “[n]ations change in form 
and in purpose,” many view state form as determinative of revolutions.30 For example, 
Huntington noticed that “the most important and obvious but also most neglected fact 
about successful great revolutions is that they do not occur in democratic political 
systems.”31 Wickhim-Crowley specifically designated patrimonial praetorian states, or as 
he calls them, “mafiacracy,” to name one of the many form-based categorizations.32 
While certain state forms may lend themselves to greater vulnerabilities given the 
material condition and International context, analysis of state-form produces conclusions 
intrinsically tied to a historical context. Furthermore, such theories can only address the 
tendency of one form to be more vulnerable, because it omits how incredible different 
state-society structure can be within a historic governing form such as fascism or 
democracy. The general explanation of structural rationalization provides an explanation 
that applies to all states regardless of form.  
 The theoretic supplement made in the Structural Realist theory of revolution 
cannot completely rectify the fact that, as Ashley has discussed, “Neorealism is bound to 
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the state.”33 The states-as-actors is an a priori commitment of the Structural Realist 
tradition. This ultimately ties it to modernization because, according to Bull, “Political 
units were thought of as civitates, principes, regni, gentes, respublicae but the idea of the 
idea of a society made up principally or exclusively of a single kind of political entity 
called ‘states’ could not take shape” given the organization of society.34 While the 
theoretic platform constructed for explaining revolutions has helped Structural Realism 
account for pre-modern phenomena, even with loosening the definition of the ‘state’ 
some tension remains.   
 
War and Revolution 
 The relationship between revolution and war has been under-studied. Walt asserts, 
“Revolution and war are among the most dramatic and important events in political life, 
yet few of the countless works on either topic devote much attention to the relationship 
between them.”35 The conclusions drawn have, curiously, found that war often leads to 
revolution and revolution often leads to war. Exemplifying the former, Tilly lists: 
“the extraction of resources for the prosecution of a war has repeatedly 
aroused revolutionary resistance; the defeat of states in war has often made 
them vulnerable to attack from their domestic enemies; the complicity of 
some portion of the armed forces with the revolutionary bloc has been 
absolutely essential to the success of the modern revolution…; the waning 
phrases of major movements of conquest … are strikingly propitious for 
revolution; and the period of readjustment immediately following large 
international conflicts also seem favorable to revolution.”36 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in Robert Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics 
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 On the other hand, historical cases suggest that revolution leads to war as well: the 
French Revolution in 1789 consumed Europe in war until 1815; the Russian Revolution 
was followed by the Cold War and numerous ‘hot’ proxy wars; the Chinese Revolution 
of 1949 can be tied to the Korean War in the early 1950s and conflict among the Sino-
Soviet border in the 1960s; the Iranian Revolution of 1979 triggered the Iran-Iraq war of 
1980 to 1988. Whereas Halliday faults status quo powers and Snyder revolutionary states 
for post-revolutionary war, Walt holds both responsible.37 
 Revolution and war are clearly interrelated phenomena. This is why, as Chan and 
Williams argue, “Revolutions need in fact to be understood in the context of the outbreak 
of war and collective violence.” 38 Hannah Arendt furthers, “the interrelationship of war 
and revolution, their reciprocation and mutual dependence, has steadily grown.”39 The 
relationship, Halliday argues, is not causal; rather, they are different expressions of “a 
broader social context.”40 In fact, the relationship between war and revolution can be 
considered on two levels. First, war leads to revolution and revolution leads to war by 
each providing an increase of pressure in the International System. In the case of 
revolutions, increased exogenous pressures tie up state capabilities, thus straining the 
state. For war, revolutions challenge the International System and alter power 
relationships, thus causing miscalculations. Yet, this level of analysis focuses on 
structurally more superficial and immediate ‘triggers’ of conflict and revolution.  
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37 See Introduction for a review of all three authors. 
38  Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, Renegade States, 24. 
39  Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: New York, Viking Press, 1965) 17. 
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A deeper structural analysis is simultaneously possible. As concluded in the last 
chapter on theory, the Structural Realist theory of revolution can be viewed system-wide. 
Here, profound shifts in the transnational material conditions increased the likelihood of 
revolution. Similarly, the changing material conditions altered state-capabilities system-
wide and thus their distribution. The redistribution of capabilities restructures the 
International System, but, as the Realist tradition has noted, changing power relations are 
also explanative of war. As a result, a surge of deep macro-structural change in the 
material conditions may lead to periods of revolution and war. This explains the more 
structurally profound relationship between revolution and war. Martin Wight called these 
periods “international revolution” due to the transformation of the international “by force, 
by war or revolution or both.” 41During these periods, Wight goes on to say, international 
revolution “blurs the distinctions between war and peace, international war and civil war, 
war and revolution.”42 In short, the relationship between war and revolution can be 
analyzed on two levels – as an immediate trigger through structural shock and as similar 
manifestations of systems-change due to trends in the material condition. 
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Chapter VI: The Future of Revolution 
 The future of revolutions in a globalized, democratized world is greatly contested. 
In 1963, Arendt commented, “wars and revolutions… have thus far determined the 
physiognomy of the twentieth century.” She went on to predict, “it seems more than 
likely that revolution, in distinction to war, will stay with us into the foreseeable future.”1 
Over one hundred years prior, Alexis de Tocqueville prophesized the opposite – that in 
fact revolutions were to become more rare.2 With the end of the Cold War, the ghost of 
de Tocqueville has seemingly returned to the 21st century. Revolution, it seems, is a 
quickly fading phenomena with the ‘end of history’.  
 
 
The End of Revolution? 
 Many view revolutions as a product of modernization. Consequently, they are 
understood, to borrow the words of Huntington, not as “not a universal category but 
rather an historically limited phenomenon.”3 As the liberal democratic tradition spreads, 
history, defined as a sociopolitical evolution – will come to an end. De Tocqueville 
originated this movement of thought in 1840 with the publication of his second volume of 
Democracy in America.  Here, he argues: 
Not only are the men of democracies not naturally desirous of revolution, 
but they are afraid of them. All revolutions more or less threaten the tenure 
of property: but most of those who live in democratic countries are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: New York, Viking Press, 1965) 17-18. 
2  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Penguin 
Putnam, 2004) 267-279. 
3  Samuel P. Huntington., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968) 265. 
!!
108!
108!
possessed of property – not only are they possessed of property, but they 
live in the condition of men who set the greatest store upon their property.4 
 
Fukuyama redefined the argument to claim that, with the collapse of communism in the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the world was no longer divided on the virtue liberal 
democracy.5 The ‘great idea’ has triumphed and history had reached its final stage. 
According to this world-view, revolutions have ended with history itself. 
 Within Revolution Studies, the future of revolution is still being debated – 
especially vis-à-vis globalization. Halliday adamantly rejects the ‘end of history thesis, 
ironically suggesting, “Since no human institution has, as yet, lasted for ever, it may be 
premature to suggest that liberal democracies will do so.”6 Contradictions still exist 
within the modern state, and although “one cannot foresee” what form of crisis will occur 
in the era of globalization, crisis will occur as it always has.7 Eric Selbin supports 
Halliday’s position, predicting that Neoliberalism will spawn revolutionary reactions. 
While he accepts the thesis that democracies preclude revolutions, Selbin finds that 
“meaningful democratic practices remain weak.” The majority are not inclusive but are 
“based instead on elite pacts.”8 Revolutions, in short, are far from irrelevant. 
 Goodwin holds a different position claiming, unlike Selbin, that democracies are 
well established. This premise leads him to conclude: “Is the age of revolutions now 
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over? I believe that it probably is.”9 Similar to Huntington, Goodwin highlights the fact 
that no revolution has ever overthrown a consolidated democracy. Still, he pointedly 
acknowledges that grave social injustices still exist within such a system. Nevertheless, 
globalization has led to the political transformation to democracy and that alone has 
“destroyed the basis for revolutionary conflict in those societies that it has reached.”10 
Nodia takes the argument a step further by claiming that “in a world where liberty and 
equality no longer face any fundamental challenge,” revolutions have seen their end.11 
This analysis appears idealistic, failing to notice many of the inequalities structurally 
inherent to globalized Neoliberalism. 
 Snyder specifies numerous reasons why revolutions are no longer an acting force 
on the world stage. First, like many authors, he cites the spread of democracy. Yet, he 
adds the spread of market-based economics and the transnationalism and rise of the 
middle class associated with it. Furthermore, the removal of weak colonial or 
neopatrimonial rulers, the reduction of the peasantry and ‘great power conflict’ explain 
the end of revolution. As he succinctly summarizes, “Revolution ushered in the modern 
world, but modernity has killed it.”12 Resilient orders built on inclusive political and 
economic systems that respond to changing pressures have removed the necessary 
conditions for revolution. 
 Two authors – Jeffery Paige and John Foran – have provided convincing 
arguments as to why the post-Cold War decline in revolution does not necessarily signify 
the ‘death; of revolutions. Paige admits, “The collapse of the Soviet Union also marked !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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10 Ibid., 303-304. 
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the end of Marxist-Leninist revolution as a historical form.”13 Nevertheless, he adds that 
revolutions as a radical state transformation can still occur, even if it does not assume the 
form popularly conceived. The notion of a post-modern form of revolution is useful to 
connect changing conditions with the continuous rationalizing mechanism. It provides an 
effective critique to those who equate the end of a historic form of revolution to the end 
of revolution itself.  
Foran adds to this criticism by pointing out that actual social revolutions are rare 
at best, therefore any apparent lull in activity is misleading. Specifically, “we shouldn’t 
expect to see a great deal of revolutionary activity at any given time, and the prospect for 
‘success’ (measured by the seizure of state power and the initiation of a project of social 
transformation) have always been poor.”14 Furthermore, he finds that the evidence from 
the Third World since 1989 suggests that it is “far from the case that revolutions are 
headed for extinction as a species of social change in the near future.”15 While others 
have cited Neoliberalism for spreading either democracy or social inequalities, Foran 
focuses on the World-Systemic Openings Neoliberalism provides due to the cyclical 
economic downturns endemic to it. Chan and Williams further explain this point, 
discussing how “structural adjustment [from the World Bank and IMF] threatens to 
unravel the bureaucratic apparatus of the post-colonial state completely.”16 They go on to 
discuss the possibility that “there will be new revolutionary challenges to this global Holy 
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13  Jeffery M. Paige, "Finding the Revolutionary in the Revolution: Social Science Concepts and the 
Future of Revolution," in John Foran, The Future of Revolutions: Rethinking Radical Change in the 
Age of Globalization (London ; New York: London ; New York : Zed Books, 2003) 27. 
14  John Foran, "The Future of Revolutions at the Fin-De-Siecle," Third World Quarterly 18, no. 5 
(12/02, 1997) 791. 
15 Ibid., 815. 
16  Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, Renegade States: The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign 
Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) 29. 
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Alliance [i.e. global financial institutions]. The pattern of twentieth-century politics 
hardly suggests that the revolutionary idea can be considered dead.”17 
 
 
From Another Perspective 
 Revolutions, like realism, are tied to the state. Thus, their fate is necessarily 
bound to it. Globalization has raised arguments about the changing nature of the power 
structure from international to transnational. That is, it is claimed that the state is 
becoming obsolete as power diffuses – even realist Joseph Nye has written about how the 
diffusion of power should alter the paradigm.18 In his more systematic examination of the 
subject, constructivist John Agnew was led to the conclusion that “the spatiality of 
power… need not be invariable reduced to state territoriality.”19 Accordingly, Gilpin 
found, “In the final decades of the twentieth century, technological, economic, and other 
developments have suggested to many individuals that the nation-state has finally ceased 
to be the most efficient unit of economic and political organization.”20  
 The twenty-first century has proven that the modern nation-state is hardly 
obsolete. The spatiality of political power, while not exclusively contained in the state-
unit, is mostly held there. Furthermore, arguments about the changing nature of global 
Capitalism and the world market making the state anachronistic run into the fact that, as 
Karl Polanyi first commented upon, Capitalism as a system requires the state to 
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17 Ibid., 30. 
18  Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 
19  John Agnew, "Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and 
Movement in World Politics," Millennium-Journal of International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999) 503. 
20  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
228. 
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continually enforce it in order to function properly.21 The state is and should continue to 
be the basic unit of analysis for the foreseeable future. That the form of the state may 
change is undeniable; regardless, this does not affect the Structural Realist theory of 
revolution given the emphasis on structural rationality. Even a post-modern state could be 
captured by the theory. In fact, it would be explained by it as a more rationalized 
structure given the International System and the material conditions system-wide. Waltz 
views that the one transformation that can fundamentally change the International System 
and the state is the move from anarchy to hierarchy – in a word, world-government. The 
realist tradition has often commented on the unlikely, and historically unprecedented 
nature of this.22 With the state secured as a fundamental political unit, revolutions too are 
ensured a place as a mechanism for reconstituting state power. 
 Finally, the ‘end of history’ argument must be refuted as a denial of the future of 
revolution. It is not only the liberal-democratic tradition that forwards the argument. 
Chan and Williams find that “there is a real danger that we will be trapped by the ‘neo-
realists’ or indeed the ‘structuralists’, into believing that we have reached the final phase 
of our development.”23 The revision made to the Structural Realist theory suggests that 
with changing material and international environment, state and society structure will 
have to adapt – a sociopolitical process that can be considered the continuation of history. 
Perhaps this can be achieved within the liberal democratic form, perhaps not – this is a 
test for epochs beyond ours. Nevertheless, to assume that the “the longest period of major 
power peace in centuries” due to the spread of liberal democracies globally is indicative 
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21  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Octagon Books, 1944). 
22 This is implicit in the logic of balancing. 
23  Chan and Williams, Renegade States, 11. 
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of future centuries without war or revolution may prove short-sighted.24 As Polanyi 
revealed, the violent systems-change in the World Wars was preceded by a hundred years 
of peace.25 Change does not come easily, but it comes nevertheless. As long as there 
exists political units – states or otherwise – competing for self-preservation within 
anarchy, any internal obstacle to mobilizing the means of survival that cannot be 
remedied must be destroyed and reconstructed, or else unit survival is abnegated. This is 
the essence of revolution and the reason for its future.  
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24 “”Latest News: Canadian Study Reports New Threats to Global Security but Reveals Encouraging 
Long-Term Trends,” Human Security Project, December 2, 2010.; Robert H. Jackson, "Continuity and 
Change in the States System," in Robert H. Jackson and Alan James 1933-, States in a Changing 
World : A Contemporary Analysis (Oxford : New York: Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : 
Oxford University Press, 1993) 355-357. 
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